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Federal Aviation Act - Interworkings of Sections 403 and
404 - Military Standby Fares
I. INTRODUCTION
Agitation between surface carriers and the airlines first became notice-
able about the time the airline industry was beginning to take shape as a
formidable contender for the carriage of passengers, mail, and cargo that
previously lay exclusively within the grasp of the surface carriers. The
policies of the New Deal administration, bent on developing a domestic
air transportation system, did much to establish the competitive strength
of the airlines.' The administration's air mail legislation, particularly the
Air Mail Act of 193 4 ,a provided a fairly definite source of income at a
time when it was badly needed. But air mail legislation, designed to meet
the exigencies of the moment,3 proved to be an inadequate remedy for the
infant industry's economic ills. It remained for the Civil Aeronautics Act
of 1938 ,4 the congressional recognition that aviation had become of age,
to provide the basis necessary for the sound development of a well-ordered
and efficient air transportation system. Included within the breadth of
this statutory directive were the principle functions of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board (CAB)-the regulation and promotion of air transport.!
Heretofore, the transportation agencies had been entrusted with the singu-
lar function of regulation.' In the course of applying this dual mandate,
the additional term, promotion, has led to a degree of confusion in CAB
decisions, and to occasional protests on the part of the surface carriers.
The outcries frequently center about the differential pricing arrangements
which the Board has permitted.'
1See Investigation of Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, 73d Cong., 2d Seass. (1934); H.R.
REP. No. 1956, 72d Cong., 2d Seass. (1933); and Address by Senator Black delivered on nationwide
radio (reprinted in 78 CONG. REc. 2715, 1934).
2 48 Stat. 933 (1934). See generally Some Implications of the Air Mail Act of 1934, 47 YALE
L.J. 465 (1934).
3 Military operation of the air mail service proved to be too costly in both lives and equipment
and had to be abandoned in favor of commercial aviation. N.Y. Times, 12 March 1934, p. 16 and
18 March 1934, p. 24.
4 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (now the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. SS
1301-1542 (1964)).
'Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, S 2, 52 Stat. 980 (now the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. S 1302 (1964)).
8Interstate Commerce Act, 49 Stat. 546 (1935), 49 U.S.C. § 304 (1964).
" See generally Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257 (1951); Government Travel Discount Tariff,
6 C.A.B. 825 (1946); and Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242 (1942).
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II. THE PROBLEM
The recent military standby rates filed by the airlines have once again
aroused the objections of surface carriers to the differential pricing arrange-
ments of the airlines." Currently, some twenty domestic trunkline and
local-service carriers offer these discounts. Their tariffs provide generally
that military personnel on furlough, leave, or pass, or within seven days
of discharge, may travel at reduced fares on a space-available or standby
basis, subject further to removal or "bumping" at intermediate points to
accommodate confirmed, regular-fare passengers. The military standby
fares of the trunklines are equivalent to approximately fifty percent of the
jet-coach fares, and those of the local-service carriers are equivalent to
approximately fifty percent of their first-class fares.'
A. Rationale For Standby Fares Generally
A carrier is willing to offer reduced-rate standby fares in the hope of
stimulating demand for additional units of a product which would other-
wise go unused. Specifically, if a plane departs with a load factor some-
what less than capacity, the empty seats are an economic waste. The extra
cost to fill these seats is de minimus. Only certain passenger costs (e.g.,
beverage and food service) on a particular flight are not fixed. If a carrier
can sell these seats at a price above the variable passenger costs, it is finan-
cially better off. However, this can be a self-defeating program unless the
standby service is carefully controlled. If all the standard-fare passengers
were able to shift to the reduced standby fare, the carrier would suffer
an economic loss at the expense of generating more traffic. Therefore, the
carrier must prevent, or at least severely limit, diversion of the regular
traffic to standby service, while at the same time marketing the standby
service.
B. Trailways' Complaint
When these tariffs first became effective in 1963 over the objections of
several air carriers, 1 they had expiration dates which have since been peri-
odically extended. In April, 1965, the expiration dates were again extended,
and in some instances the expiry date was even cancelled." It was in this
context that the National Trailways Bus System, representing its forty-
six independent member carriers, demanded an investigation of military
standby rates. Trailways alleged that the discounts were diverting traffic
from the buses and that the military standby fares were "unjustly dis-
criminatory, unduly preferential and prejudicial, and unjust or unreason-
able" and, thus, violative of Subsections 404(a) and (b) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958.
'See Proposed Military Standby Fares, CAB Docket Nos. 15845 el al., CAB Order No. E-22186
(20 May 1965) [hereinafter CAB Order No. E-22186] for a consolidation of the complaints
against the pricing arrangements of twenty airlines.
'Id. at 1-2.
"In CAB Order Nos, E-19376 (14 March 1963); E-19401 (22 March 1963); E-19535 (29
April 1963); and E-19605 (23 May 1963), the Board dismissed various air carriers' complaints
against the original military standby tariffs.
"CAB Docket Nos. 15925 et al., CAB Order No. E-22068 (22 April 1965), p. 1.
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The CAB subsequently dismissed Trailways' demands for an investiga-
tion on the basis that the complaints were merely repetitions of complaints
filed by certain air carriers two years previously and were, in effect,
petitions for reconsideration of arguments which the Board had found to
be without merit." The Board noted that until conditions changed that
would substantially alter its prior position, the original basis for denial of
the complaints remained valid. Trailways has asked all eleven United
States district courts of appeal for review of the CAB's refusal to investi-
gate airline discount fares for military personnel. 3
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Any problem involving an airline's policy of granting price differentials
to identifiable groups necessarily involves a consideration of sections
403 (b), 404(a) and (b), and 416(b) of the act. This article is intended
to be an examination of the legislative history, interpreted meanings, and
case law having a bearing on these sections in order to arrive at an under-
standing of the technical interrelationship among the regulatory sections.
The analysis will at all times be focused upon the military standby fares,
but this same analysis can be applied to determine the validity of any of
the rash of promotional fares, presently much in vogue, that have been
extended to various groups."'
It is best at the outset to eliminate any confusion that might arise from
section 1002 (e). The sections set out in the preceeding paragraph deal
with the duties of the carriers in establishing rates. To ensure compliance,
section 1002 (e) gives the Board the power to prescribe rates and practices
of air carriers should the airlines fail to follow their statutory duties. The
duties of the carriers and the power of the Board are in separate paragraphs
in order to avoid confusing the considerations which the Board must take
into account in making carrier rates once the carriers themselves cannot
arrive at just and reasonable rates."
Once it is clear which sections are of primary concern,0 the most satis-
factory approach to an understanding of these sections is to begin with
the most clear-cut and work toward the more complex. Note that the eco-
nomic regulations of sections 403 and 404 relating to tariffs and rates were
not discussed in Congress, possibly because the wording was adopted sub-
stantially verbatim from corresponding provisions in the Interstate Com-
merce Act and it was felt that the wording, in light of the Commission's
experience, was sufficiently clear and unobjectionable.'" At any rate, the
" CAB Order No. E-22186 at 3. These complaints marked the first time a surface carrier had
raised an objection to these discounts.
"aAviation Daily, 22 July 1965, p. 121.
4 E.g., Young Adult Proposed Fares, CAB Docket No. 16826, CAB Order No. E-23138 (20
Jan. 1966); Proposed Government First-Class Fares, CAB Docket Nos. 16597 et al., CAB Order
No. E-22929 (24 Nov. 1965).
15 RHYNE, CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT ANNOTATED 123-24 (1939).
'6Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 403(b), 404, and 416(b), 72 Stat. 758-71, 49 U.S.C.
SS 1373(b), 1374, and 1386(b) (1964).
'1 Markham & Blair, The Effect of Tariff Provisions Filed Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, is
J. AIR L. & CoM. 251 (1948).
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assumption is that by adopting these sections the legislators knew and
understood the interpretation of these provisions under the Interstate Com-
merce Act and acquiesced in these definitions.'" Therefore, to gain an in-
sight into the purpose of these provisions, resort must be had to the judicial
decisions construing the Interstate Commerce Act or, if there are no such
decisions, then to the legislative history of that act.
A. Reasonableness Requirement
Early in aviation history, the suggestion that rates be fixed on a basis
of fair return upon valuation of property was overruled as unworkable
in the airline industry.'" Reasonable cost of adequate air transportation
was set up as the measuring device for rates of return. Section 404(a),
accordingly, requires carriers to charge reasonable individual and joint
rates for the carriage of persons and property. This reasonableness of
rates concept applies to all fares under the act regardless of the nature of
the service involved. Since this provision was taken from the Interstate
Commerce Act, experience under that act is helpful in determining "rea-
sonable rates."" In addition, the CAB has developed two tests which it
uses when the reasonableness of rates is in issue-the "fare-cost" test and
the "profit-impact" test. These will be fully discussed later in the context
of the military standby fares.
B. Dual Prohibitions Of Section 404(b)
Section 404 (b) outlaws two types of discrimination." The first involves
like and contemporaneous service, that is, offering the same service at two
different prices. Should a carrier attempt to offer such duplicitous service,
complaints would be leveled under the "unjust discrimination" provision
of section 404(b). Note that while charging different rates for services
that are essentially the same constitutes a discrimination, this is not in itself
conclusively a violation since section 404 (b) is only directed against unjust
discrimination. Summer Excursion Fares' established CAB adhesion to the
" RHYNE, OP. cit. supra at 124.
'See Hearings on S. 3027 Before a Subcommittee on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 59-60 (1935) (Testimony of Mr. Putnam).
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, S 404(a), 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. S 1374(a) (1964):
It shall be the duty of every air carrier to provide and furnish interstate and over-
seas air transportation .. . to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable in-
dividual and joint rates, fares, and charges, and just and reasonable classifications,
rules, regulations, and practices relating to such air transportation ...
"'See the following cases defining "reasonable rates" under the Interstate Commerce Act: Ann
Arbor R.R. v. United States, 281 U.S. 658 (1930); United States v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 279
U.S. 768 (1929); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 274 U.S. 29 (1927); and Western
Paper Makers' Chem. Co. v. United States, 271 U.S. 268 (1926).
"
5Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 404(b), 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1964):
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any undue or unrea-
sonable preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, or description
of traffic in air transportation in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular
person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust dis-
crimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect
whatsoever.
2 11 C.A.B. 218, 222-23 (1950).
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traditional "rule of equality" which is a public utility concept followed
by the Board in determining whether discriminations are unjust."' The
"rule of equality" consists of a three-factor test:
(1) is the service to which the proposed fares would apply like and
contemporaneous with service to which standard fares apply;
(2) are the circumstances and conditions under which the reduced-
rate and standard-fare service are rendered substantially similar; and
(3) do the services pertain to the transportation of like traffic.
If application of the "rule of equality" results in a negative answer to any
one of these three factors, unjust discrimination is not present." If appli-
cation results in three affirmative responses, then the reduced rate is un-
justly discriminatory per se.*
However, the fact that rates offered to an identifiable group run afoul
of the "rule of equality" does not necessarily disallow the reduced fare.
In a few defined instances, unjustly discriminatory rates to identifiable
groups are expressly permitted. Section 403 (b) contains an enumeration"
of those to whom the air carrier may grant free or reduced rates despite
classification as unjust discrimination under the three-factor test of sec-
tion 404 (b). The exemptions of 403 (b) apply only to unjust discrimina-
tion cases, and have no application in discrimination cases where like and
" See, e.g., Mohawk Student Fares, CAB Docket No. 15949, CAB Order No. E-21912 (16
March 1965); Caribbair Student Standby Fares, CAB Docket No. 15786, CAB Order No.
E-21667 (12 Jan. 1965); Frontier Teacher Tariff, CAB Docket No. 14526, CAB Order No.
E-19620 (28 May 1963); Military Tender Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 902 (1959); and Braniff Air-
ways Excursion Fares, 12 C.A.B. 227 (1950).
'Brief for Respondent, p. 11, The Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. CAB, 350 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir.
1965), where attorneys for the CAB define unjust discrimination as existing "where the transporta-
tion is a like service, of like traffic, [and] under substantially similar circumstances and conditions."
" Contra, CAB Order No. E-22186 at 4. There the Board maintained that the existence
of "the most compelling circumstances" may justify special fares based solely on identity even
though the identifiable group is not included within section 403(b)'s list of exceptions. This
view was adopted in Military Tender Investigation. The Board arrived at this view by relying on
two Board precedents, Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257 (1951), and Free and Reduced-Rate
Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B. 481 (1951), as indicating that the Board could look at factors
outside the actual carriage of passengers for justification of an unjustly discriminatory fare. This
line of cases is dealt with in the textual discussions infra.
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 403(b), 72 Star. 758, as amended by 74 Stat. 445, 49
U.S.C. S 1373(b) (1964):
Nothing in this Act shall prohibit such air carriers or foreign air carriers, under such
terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe, from issuing or interchanging tickets
or passes for free or reduced-rate transportation to their directors, officers, and
employees (including retired directors, officers, and employees who are receiving re-
tirement benefits from any air carrier or foreign air carrier), the parents and immedi-
ate families of such officers and employees, and the immediate families of such direc-
tors; widows, widowers, and minor children of employees who have died as a direct
result of personal injury sustained while in the performance of duty in the service
of such air carrier or foreign air carrier; witnesses and attorneys attending any legal
investigation in which any such air carrier is interested; persons injured in aircraft
accidents and physicians and nurses attending such persons; immediate families,
including parents, of persons injured or killed in aircraft accidents where the object
is to transport such persons in connection with such accident; and any person or
property with the object of providing relief in cases of general epidemic, pestilence,
or other calamitous visitation; and in the case of overseas or foreign air transportation,
to such other persons and under such other circumstances as the Board may by regu-
lations prescribe. Any air carrier or foreign air carrier, under such terms and condi-
tions as the Board may prescribe, may grant reduced-rate transportation to ministers
of religion on a space-available basis.
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contemporaneous service is not involved. The CAB expressed its interpre-
tation of sections 403 (b) and 404 (b) as follows:
Clearly the Act and the law generally require equality of treatment and pre-
clude the offering of special fares or rates for special persons or shippers. It
has been held, however, that special fares for certain categories of persons are
not precluded merely because such persons are not listed in Section 403 (b) of
the Act, and that the anti-discrimination provisions of the Act are not vio-
lated when different fares or rates are offered to different persons in instances
in which the conditions and circumstances of carriage are substantially dis-
similar, or if such carriage is in fact not like and contemporaneous, or if there
are substantial differences in the types of traffic to which the fares or rates are
applicable."s
As was pointed out, section 404 (b) outlaws another type of discrimina-
tion. The section's provisions do not require absolute equality among pas-
sengers and shippers, but rather outlaw "unjust discrimination" and "undue
preferences and prejudices." This latter prohibition is designed to meet
rate differentials that relate to service that is substantially dissimilar, that
is, a differential which, when juxtaposed with the "rule of equality," fails
to garner affirmative answers to each of the three factors."" Where the
service in question is not like and contemporaneous, the issue becomes:
is it "unduly preferential or prejudicial" to offer the discount to a par-
ticular identifiable group and not to the general public. As a public utility
and in return for the privilege of operating in a more limited competitive
atmosphere, the air carriers assume an obligation of providing service on
equally favorable terms to all who request it.'
To decide this question, the Board employs the broad category of "com-
pelling circumstances." Not amenable to exact definition, this term has
been found to include promotional and competitive considerations? and
matters of national or public interest.5 ' If the airline can show, by an
accumulation of factors,"5 that compelling circumstances justify the grant
of a favorable rate to a specific identifiable group in preference to another
group or the public in general, then the discount does not occasion an
objection of undue preference or prejudice and will be allowed if it meets
the reasonableness requirement of section 404 (a).
"8 Brief for Respondent, p. 9, The Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. CAB, 350 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
a1 Military Tender Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 902, 923 (1959). There it was stated:
[T]he question of unjust discrimination is raised only when there are unequal
fares or rates for like and contemporaneous transportation between the same points,
whereas the undue preference or prejudice standard is concerned exclusively with
rates for the different but related services or for similar services between different
points.
o Since this provision was also taken from the Interstate Commerce Act, some early litigation
involving the wording "undue preference and prejudice" is helpful. See, e.g., Virginian Ry. v.
United States, 272 U.S. 658 (1926); United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 266 U.S. 191 (1924);
and United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 263 U.S. 551 (1924).
" Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257, 258 (1951).
"
5 Proposed Military Standby Fares, CAB Docket Nos. 15925 et al., CAB Order No. E-22068
(22 April 1965).
asSee Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. 921, 927 (1950), to the effect that a mere
increase in the carriers' revenues would not, in itself, be sufficient justification for a discriminatory
fare.
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C. CAB's Blanket Exemption Power
Finally, section 4 16(b)" contains the broad power of the Board to
exempt carriers from any provision of the act or order or regulation
thereunder. This section is not absolute and is intended to apply in re-
lieving hardships in extraordinary situations. Section 416(b) requires the
Board to find, first, that enforcement of the provisions which are being
waived is or would be an undue burden on the carrier by reason of the
limited extent of, or unusual circumstances affecting, the operations of the
air carrier and, second, that enforcement is not in the public interest.
The exemption power is sparingly used and on the occasions when the
Board's use of 416(b) has been challenged, the reviewing courts have
applied strict standards to the exercise of this power." It is doubtful that
sufficient findings could be made to exempt under 416(b) the ordinary
promotional discount practices explored by this article.
IV. MILITARY STANDBY FARES
In light of the statutory background set forth in the preceeding pages,
an examination of the military discounts will be made in an attempt to
reach meaningful conclusions about the validity of the military rate re-
ductions in particular and about the validity of the CAB's current ap-
proach to promotional fares in general. The initial testing ground for all
differential pricing situations is section 404(b). If a discount is to finally
receive CAB approval, it must successfully negotiate the dual prohibitory
provisions against "unjust discrimination" and "undue preference or
prejudice."
A. Like And Contemporaneous-Unjust Discrimination Issue
The military standby fares, originally instituted in 1963, have now
been extended indefinitely by the Board. Trailways, feeling the competi-
tive pinch, has sought relief by filing its consolidated suit in the Fifth
Circuit.' There is some question as to Trailways' "standing" to bring suit
since section 404 (b) exists to protect the airline's passengers and shippers, '
not competing modes of transportation."' Nevertheless, it appears that
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 416(b) (1), 72 Stat. 771, 49 U.S.C. § 1386 (1964):
The Board, from time to time and to the extent necessary may . . . exempt from
the requirements of this title or any provision thereof, or any rule, regulation, term,
condition, or limitation prescribed thereunder, any air carrier or class of air carriers,
if it finds that the enforcement of this title or such provision, or such rule, regulation,
term, condition, or limitation is or would be an undue burden on such air carrier
or class of air carriers by reason of the limited extent of, or unusual circumstances
affecting, the operations of such air carrier or class of air carriers and is not in the
public interest.
' See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways v. CAB, 261 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 912 (1959); American Airlines v. CAB, 235 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S.
905 (1956). See also Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1956) (on airline fares for ministers).
"'Transcontinental Bus System, Inc. v. CAB, appeal docketed, No. 22791, 5th Cir., 3 March
1966.
" See, e.g., ICC v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 220 U.S. 326 (1912); ICC v. Baltimore & 0. Ry.,
145 U.S. 263, 281 (1892).
" lCC v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 372 U.S. 744 (1913) makes it clear that neither the
airlines nor the surface carriers need consider the other when establishing rates. Rather, the CAB
1966]
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Trailways will have "standing" as a person aggrieved."' When the Board
permitted these standby tariffs to become effective, it did so without bene-
fit of suspension or investigation because it had no information at that
time as to the propriety or reasonableness of the reduced rates." Currently,
the Board still has only fragmentary information due to the failure of the
carriers to report the economic results achieved under their temporary
1963 permits."'
In its attempt to establish grounds for a full investigation, Trailways
alleged alternatively that the military discounts violate both prohibitory
provisions of section 404 (b). In support of its allegation that the discounts
are unjustly discriminatory, Trailways asserted that all special fares based
solely on identity are unjustly discriminatory per se unless specifically per-
mitted under section 403 (b)."
A situation on all fours with Trailways' contention is the struggle, be-
ginning in 1949, to permit reduced-rate service to bona fide ministers of
religion. United Airlines proposed a twenty-five percent discount, based
solely on identity, to all clergymen. Such a price differential clearly
brought into question the firmly established principle that a reduced rate
must be reasonably open to all and free from any restriction based solely
on identity. It was immediately obvious to the Board that the proposed
reductions would be classified as unjust discrimination once it had been
exposed to the "rule of equality." Consequently, the Board rejected
United's proposal, holding that an amendment to the Civil Aeronautics
Act was required before such reductions could be permitted.' Subse-
quently, legislation was introduced to amend section 403 (b) to allow re-
is required to insure the sound development of the air transport industry and to permit air fares
to be offered at the lowest possible level consistent with the act and the carriers' ability to do so
economically. In these circumstances, surface carriers have no standing to complain on the basis
of alleged financial impact on them.
"' FCC v. Sanders Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 121 F.2d
462 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See also, Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. CAB, 350 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
where the Board admits standing in a situation similar to the military discount complaint.
'o CAB Orders cited note 10 supra.
"' Brief for Petitioner before the CAB, p. 11, Consolidated Joint Complaint of National Trailways
Bus System and Its Forty-Six Independent Member Carriers Requesting Suspension and Investigation
(I April 1965).
"3This is not, however, to say that Trailways claims that the failure to include the government
in the category of persons enumerated in section 403 (b) denotes a congressional intent to foreclose
all rate reductions--only unjust discriminations.
"a See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1956). In Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), the Board stated:
[I]t is the opinion of the Board that to exempt ministers of religion from the gen-
eral prohibition against the granting of free or reduced-rate transportation would be
a serious departure from the sound policy of the act.
In subsequent situations involving proposed discounts based on identity alone, the Board has similarly
acknowledged the statutory limits upon its power to grant free or reduced transportation:
In passing the Civil Aeronautics Act, the Congress in section 403 (b), which pro-
vides for free and reduced-rate transportation, substantially narrowed the categories
to which such transportation could be offered ....
The Congress amended Section 403(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1956 to
permit the granting of reduced rate transportation to ministers, but although as in-
dicated above the Board has held that a tariff favoring students was unjustly discrimi-
natory, the section was not broadened to include students as a favored class. (Foot-
notes omitted.)
Capital Groups Student Fares, 25 C.A.B. 280, 285-86 (1957).
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
duced rates to the clergy on a space-available or standby basis." The
question expressly in issue was whether the established policy should be
maintained or whether it should be abandoned by permitting the airlines
to freely grant rate reductions to all groups with a legitimate claim to
special consideration." Former Chairman James Durfee stated:
From time to time representatives of schools, women's organizations, youth
organizations and others seeking to participate in national events have sought
free or reduced-rate privileges. The Board has uniformly refused to issue ex-
emption orders granting these requests, as it was believed that such action
would be contrary to the established policy of Congress.'
Cognizant of its congressional directive to promote the air transport
industry,' the CAB's main objection to the bill as originally introduced,
without the standby provision, was that it might result in frequent dis-
placement of regular-fare passengers by ministers. The Board noted the
substantial difference between the space problems of surface carriers and
those of air carriers, and concluded that the airlines' relatively limited space
makes it very likely that a discount traveler could displace a regular-fare
passenger in the absence of a space available limitation. This concern over
diversion was effectively dispelled by predicating the discount on space
availability.' The adoption of the legislation amending section 403 (b)
to permit airlines, if they so desired, to grant special rate reductions on a
standby basis to ministers would seem to indicate that the standby feature
of a discount granted solely on the basis of identity might not by itself
make the service "substantially different" so as to avoid an unjust dis-
crimination problem."
A contra argument can be raised based on the size of the group to
which the standby provision is to be applied. Since the clergy is a relatively
small group, it is possible that the space-available restriction as to them
will have no real effect. Conversely, where the group to which the standby
provision applies represents a potentially large group of travelers (i.e., the
military), the standby restriction will prove to be a meaningful hindrance
to one's ability to readily obtain passage; thus, the service available is
"substantially different." This supposition would seem to be discredited by
the fact that the average load factors on the majority of domestic air
routes do not begin to approach capacity."' However, the average load
"S. 3149, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1956). The bill now appears as part of the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 758, 49 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (1964).
"' See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 29-30 (1956).
46S. REP. No. 2013, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1956).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102(c), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (1964).
"'U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 3808 (1956).
'In Free and Reduced-Rate Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B. 481, $01 (1951), the Board notes
that the standby provision has bearing in determining the unjustness of a rate discrimination. The
provision
does not alter the character of the accommodations and services, it does however,
appear to enter into the question whether . . . there is a measurable difference in the
cost of the service or in the value of the service to the passenger. Such a difference,
if it still exists, is of the type that inheres in the transportation itself, so as to differ-
entiate such transportation from the carriage of other passengers.
soCAB Order No. E-22186 at 5.
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factor argument ignores the fact that passengers do not travel uniformly;
that is, some flights travel at capacity and some flights service far fewer
passengers than the average. Thus, it is asserted that in view of this ir-
regularity of flow, the standby passenger representing a large discount
group is uncertain of obtaining passage and, thus, the service provided
him is "substantially different." The fallacy in this approach is that it
overlooks the fact that while traffic flow is not uniform, the flow of stand-
by traffic can be made irregular in order to have peak standby flows coin-
cide with the slack periods in the regular traffic flow. This timing of the
standby group is especially possible with military traffic."1 The result of
timing is that the standby passenger is now likely to obtain a seat.
From the above analysis, it seems reasonable to conclude that a standby
provision attached to a reduced rate will not, by itself, generate a mini-
mum of one negative answer to the three-factor test of the "rule of
equality" so as to qualify the service provided as "substantially different."
The size of the identifiable group under a space-available provision like-
wise appears immaterial." Therefore, it seems that the extension of such a
reduced rate would require legislation similar to the clergy amendment
before the Board would have the statutory authority to approve the rate."
All of the above discussion relating to the test of unjust discrimination
as revealed by application of the "rule of equality" involves cases decided
only upon factors related to carriage. Indeed, the weight of precedents
indicates that only factors relating to the actual carriage are relevant when
applying the "rule of equality." However, the CAB maintains that in
determining the answer to each of the three factors, it is not limited to a
consideration of the conditions of carriage." The principal decision sanc-
tioning the CAB's position is Military Tender Investigation." In that case
the Board found that two factors of the "rule of equality" should be
" The timing of military standby traffic has in fact been accomplished. See Proposed Military
Fares, CAB Docket No. 15845, CAB Order No. E-21845 (26 Feb. 1965) p. 2. Note also that the
airlines ensure a degree of timing in their "youth fares" by suspending their use during peak holiday
periods.
" In light of the foregoing analysis, it appears that the standby provision, instead of being a
factor directed primarily at influencing the passenger, is mainly a device to assist the carrier in
preventing excessive self-diversion.
"U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 3064 (1960). Since the amendment of section 403(b) to
allow the clergy to be eligible for reduced rates, other amendments have been found necessary in
order to broaden the existing category of exemptions. These later amendments dealt primarily with
airline personnel and relatives of those injured in airline accidents. Some of the arguments and
points raised at the time serve to emphasize the necessity of a Congressional amendment when a
group not previously included within section 403 (b) is offered a reduced rate and the service is
like and contemporaneous with regular-fare passengers. At page 3065 it is stated:
Several years ago the CAB reviewed and investigated all the practices of the regu-
lated air carriers in the granting of free or reduced-rate transportation. This in-
vestigation disclosed that many of the air carriers were granting such transportation
to persons who did not appear to qualify within the limited number of categories
specified in S 403 (b) . . . the Board promptly forbade the continuation of such
practices.
Subsequently, the Board itself sponsored the amendments necessary to regularize and validate these
industry practices.
"See, e.g., Eastern Cent. Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 321 U.S. at 205-06 (1944).
" Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257 (1951); Free and Reduced-Rate Transportation Case, 14
C.A.B. 481 (1951).
" 2 8 C.A.B. 902 (1959).
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answered in the affirmative; the service was like and contemporaneous,
and the service was rendered to like traffic. 7 However, the cumulative
effect of considerations outside the carriage itself was great enough to
persuade the Board that the conditions and circumstances surrounding the
carriage of military traffic were "substantially different" from those sur-
rounding the carriage of non-military traffic s A similar application to
the military standby fares in the Trailways dispute enabled the Board to
conclude that the rates under consideration were also offered under "sub-
stantially different" circumstances."
To examine the correctness of this departure from the traditional appli-
cation of the "rule of equality," it is necessary to note some generalities
in regard to the background of the regulatory sections which spawned the
three-factor test. Sections 403(b) and 404(b) of the Federal Aviation
Act were taken almost verbatim from corresponding sections of the Inter-
state Commerce Act." In suits under the Interstate Commerce Act involv-
ing alleged unjust discrimination by one mode of surface transportation
against another mode of surface carrier, the Commission has allowed
factors outside actual carriage to influence the outcome of an application
of the three-factor test."1 Because of the closeness between the CAB's
applicable sections and the ICC's, one might expect the "rule of equality"
to be applied in similar fashion by the CAB, thus justifying the Board's
approach in Military Tender Investigation. It would seem, however, that
this is not the case.
The ICC cases!" which form the basis for the Board's departure in Mili-
tary Tender Investigation do not affect the pertinent CAB sections since
they were founded upon considerations peculiar to surface carriers. In
Eastern-Cent. Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States,"' the decision to allow
factors outside carriage to affect the three-factor test was bottomed on the
failure of the Commission to implement the National Transportation
Policy as set forth in the Interstate Commerce Act." This act requires the
ICC to have due regard for other modes of surface transportation when
setting rates so as to foster sound economic conditions among rail, motor,
and water carriers. Since all surface transportation is now under one na-
tional plan, the problems of carrier pricing are commingled with planned
balance. Such a uniform policy is a protectionist one in that the emphasis
I7 ld. at 905.
s The additional factors the Board considered, all clearly circumstances unrelated to the actual
fact of carriage, were:
(1) keen competition with the railroads for the military traffic;
(2) cost savings in serving the military as compared to non-military traffic; and
(3) the fact that the federal government was the recipient of the reduced fare. Id. at 906.
soCAB Order No. E-22186 at 3.
'
0 Markham & Blair, supra note 17.
61 Eastern-Cent. Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 321 U.S. 194 (1944).
62 In Military Tender Investigation the Board bases its approach on two earlier CAB decisions,
Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257 (1951) and Free and Reduced-Rate Transportation Case, 14
C.A.B. 481 (1951). In Tour Basing Fares, the underlying ICC cases cited at page 258 are: Eastern-
Cent. Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 321 U.S. 194 (1944); Barringer & Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 1 (1942); and Texas & Pac. R.R. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197 (1895).
6321 U.S. 194 (1944).
4 See 49 U.S.C. preceding §5 1, 301, 901, and 1001.
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shifts from protecting the consumer (the whole purpose behind section
404 (b)) to limiting price competition."'
Therefore, at the occasion of the CAB's original break with the tradi-
tional manner of application of the "rule of equality," there was no
properly applicable judicial authority for considering factors outside of
carriage. This error has been carried over in the Military Tender Investi-
gation and in the Board's decision upholding the military standby fares.
Since the "rule of equality" is unquestionably the correct approach to un-
just discrimination charges and since a standby provision alone seemingly
will not transform the transportation into "substantially different" service,
the probability exists that the military standby fare is outlawed as unjust
discrimination in the absence of a section 403 (b) exemption. However, to
achieve a complete discussion of the problem of rate discrimination, it is
assumed that the courts will find the military discount "substantially differ-
ent," either because they adopt the CAB's method of applying the "rule of
equality" or because they determine that the "bumping" provision by
itself, or collectively with the standby provision, sufficiently alters the
circumstances of carriage. Thus, attention is focused on the second pro-
hibitory provision of section 404 (b)-undue preference and prejudice.
B. Undue Preference And Prejudice
If it is assumed that the three-factor test throws the military standby
fares into the "substantially different" category, attention is turned to
whether the carrier may lawfully extend the standby service exclusively
to the military." To judge the propriety of the military discount, the CAB
must consider the merits of singling out the military from all identifiable
groups of travelers for the reduction. The very nature of this task involves
sorting through factors which are outside the actual fact of carriage.
Whenever the Board has examined conditions and circumstances surround-
ing the fact of carriage, it has labeled them "compelling circumstances." '
In its order refusing to investigate Trailways' complaint against the mili-
tary discount, the CAB found the compelling circumstances to include (1)
considerations of national interest, and (2) competitive considerations."8 As
to the former, the Department of Defense has set forth the public interest
factors supporting the continuance of the military reduction, the most sub-
stantial of which is the morale factor in permitting rapid transportation to
"s Silberman, Price Discrimination and the Regulation of Air Transportation, 31 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 198, 212 (1965). This still remains true in a modified sense due to the 1958 amendment to
section 15(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Now, the rates of the surface carriers will not be
maintained at an artificially high level merely to keep another mode of surface transportation alive.
In Eastern Cent. Motor Carriers case, the Court's approval of earlier cases following the traditional
application of the "rule of equality" leads to the permissible inference that Barringer & Co. v.
United States, cited in Military Tender Investigation, is likewise of no importance, it too having
arisen after the adoption of the National Transportation Policy in 1940. The remaining case cited
as support in Military Tender Investigation, Texas & Pac. R.R. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 197 (1895), seems
to be effectively distinguished virtually out of existence by ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry, 168 U.S.
144 (1897).
"Investigation of Seaboard and Western Airlines, Inc., 11 C.A.B. 372 (1950).
"7E.g., Military Tender Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 902 (1959).
68CAB Order No. E-22186 at 4.
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be available to servicemen at a price within their reach."' For all its appeal,
the public interest argument is weakened somewhat by the fact that in some
instances"0 airlines do not offer the military reduction on routes where there
is no surface competition. In order to discredit this argument, the airlines
must prove that offering the standbys in noncompetitive markets would
be financially deleterious and, hence, contrary to their statutory directive
to offer reasonable rates."1
Until the airlines submit data proving the discount is financially de-
leterious, competitive considerations would seem to form a more solid
foundation upon which to establish the existence of the compelling cir-
cumstances sufficient to justify offering the standby discounts solely to the
military. The airlines point out that both the railroads and the buses offer
regular reduced fares to military personnel on furlough."' They argue
that if air carriers are prohibited from offering the military standby fare
they will be at a competitive disadvantage with surface carriers in the
transportation of military personnel."'
Trailways, however, asserts that its military rates have a negligible effect
on the airlines due to the air carriers' inherent advantage of time saving.
Moreover, Trailways cites several instances where its members have suffered
severe financial setbacks when forced into head-to-head competition with
the airlines' military standby fares.'4 The results of the Military Tender
Investigation showed that the economy of the surface carriers attracted
the majority of the short-haul passengers but that on the long haul, where
the inherent time advantage of air carriers is most apparent, the airlines
captured most of the military travelers. Therefore, it would appear that
competition through rate reductions, especially in short-haul markets, is
prima facie a compelling circumstance justifying the airlines' military
standbys. But the figures are not current and, therefore, not conclusive.
Perhaps the standby discount is so low as to have a diversionary effect
upon the airlines' net revenue. Such a result would clearly violate section
102, which applies to all proceedings under Title IV," and could not be
justified by promotional considerations alone."0 In view of the fact that the
airlines have failed to supply the CAB with information on the economic
impact of the military discount, it appears that the only way to resolve
the question is to conduct an investigation.
"'These public interest factors have been developed at greater length by the Department of
Defense in the record of the New Bern and Jacksonville--Camp Lejeune Service Case, CAB Docket
No. 14560, CAB Order No. E-22427 (9 July 1965).
"
0 Brief for Petitioner before the CAB, pp. 33-34, Consolidated Joint Complaint of National
Trailways Bus System and Its Forty-Six Independent Member Carriers Requesting Suspension and
Investigation (5 April 1965).
71 Section 404(a), set out in note 20 supra. A rate is unreasonable if it does not satisfy the full
cost or profit-impact tests set out in text accompanying note 78.
'2 Interstate Commerce Act, § 22(1), 54 Stat. 899 (1944), 49 U.S.C. S 22(1) (1964).
71 Cost savings inherent in the carriage of military as opposed to non-military traffic and the fact
that the federal government is the recipient of the discount were also found by the Board in Military
Tender Investigation to be compelling circumstances. 28 C.A.B. at 909-10 (1959).
" Brief for Petitioner before the CAB, p. 10, Consolidated Joint Complaint of National Trailways
Bus System and Its Forty-Six Independent Member Carriers Requesting Suspension and Investigation
(5 April 1965).
73 Title IV-Air Carrier Economic Regulation, 2 Av. L. Rup. (9 Av. Cas.) 5 1, 107.
"' Hawaiian Common Fares Case, 10 C.A.B. at 929 (1949).
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C. Reasonableness Of The Military Discount
Section 404(a)'s requirement that all rates be reasonable applies to all
tariffs filed with the CAB by domestic carriers.
The question whether a fare or rate is just or reasonable turns primarily on
the relationship between the revenue produced and the cost incurred by the
carrier in providing the service, not on the relative effects of the fare or rate
on different passengers, shippers, or places."'
1. Standards Employed to Test the Reasonableness of a Tariff
The Board has traditionally adopted two standards to ascertain the
reasonableness of a tariff: (1) the fare-cost test, and (2) the profit-
impact test.
a. Fare-Cost Test-This standard involves a comparison of the fare
level with the fully-allocated costs of service. Since this test requires each
fare offered to at least equal its proportionate cost of the flight, it is used
only in those rare instances in which the airline's capacity is geared to the
reduced-rate traffic." Since indications from the airlines are that the
military standby traffic represents only five percent of the total traffic,"
it is doubtful that the reasonableness of the instant rates should be mea-
sured by the fare-cost test.
In the past, several carriers have attempted to show the reasonableness
of their price differential by suggesting an added-cost or top-off standard."0
This theory assumes that most of the costs of a flight are fixed, so that, if
the carrier can sell an otherwise empty seat at a price above the variable
passenger costs, the carrier is financially better off than if the seats remained
empty; thus, any price covering the minimal variable costs is reasonable.
Such an approach was expressly rejected in the Summer Fares Excursion
Case." In Free and Reduced-Rate Transportation Case,' the Board con-
sidered the added-cost theory and stated:
This argument is unsound from an accounting and legal standpoint; the cost
of transporting the agent includes all the expenses that enter into the provision
of identical service and accommodations for a full-fare passenger. The carrier's
direct-flight expense, its maintenance expense, and all its other operating costs
are as fully assignable to the travel agent ...as they are to any full-fare
passenger who might occupy the same seat. "
b. Profit-Impact Test-This is the standard customarily applied to fares
for services offered on a space-available basis where the carrier's capacity
is geared to the regular full-fare traffic." ' To satisfy the profit-impact test
a rate reduction must produce sufficient new traffic to offset the loss of
"Free and Reduced-Rate Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B. at 493 (1951).
"tSee, e.g., Pittsburgh-Philadelphia No-Reservation Fare Investigation, 34 C.A.B. 508 (1961),
which held that the reasonableness of an Allegheny fare for a no-reservation service must be de-
termined on the basis of fully-allocated costs.
"CAB Order No. E-22186 at 6.
'*See, e.g., Free and Reduced-Rate Transportation Case, 14 C.A.B. 481 (1951); Summer Ex-
cursion Fares Case, 11 C.A.B. 218 (1950).
s1 11 C.A.B. 218 (1950).
s, 14 C.A.B. 481 (1951).
i Id. at 502.
"CAB Order No. E-22186 at 6.
[Vol. 32
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
revenue from self-diversion plus the added cost of carrying the additional
traffic. In taking into account the diversionary effect inherent in all rate
reductions, it differs from the top-off approach which merely requires the
airline to cover the minimal passenger costs of the additional traffic.
The Board indulges in the assumption that, in spite of the failure of
the airlines to supply information of self-diversion and generation, the
industry would not urge the continuance of the military discounts unless
it were to their economic advantage to do so." Such an assumption appears
unfounded. It is entirely possible that the carriers, failing to create the
required generation under the profit-impact test, are following an added-
cost or top-off standard of their own on the theory that the promotional
advantages to be gained by exposing additional military personnel to air
travel are preferable to empty seats with no decrease in revenue. If the
carriers are engaging in such a procedure, they are allowing a manifestly
unreasonable discount. " The failure of the airlines to provide enlightening
information in this area suggests the necessity of an investigation of mili-
tary standby fares.
V. CONCLUSION
The article has focused primarily upon sections 404 and 403 in order
to clarify the framework within which Congress intended the Board to
operate in the exercise of its economic regulatory powers. Correct applica-
tion of sections 404 and 403 will enable the CAB to comply with the con-
gressional intent and to move away from its ad hoc decisions of late."
The Board is without power to liberalize the Federal Aviation Act to suit
transitory policies but, rather, is responsible for enforcement of the act
in accord with congressional intent.
Public sentiment is quite naturally with the servicemen, but it was like-
wise with the clergy. Nevertheless, in the latter case the CAB enforced
the act as written and the result was an amendment to section 403 (b)
permitting the clergy rate reductions. Therefore, it is submitted that Con-
gress should authorize an amendment permitting military discounts on a
standby basis in order to prevent the Board from compromising its statute
in favor of public sentiment and promotion."'
Charles J. McGuire
s5 Ibid.
s See accompanying note 80 supra.87 E.g., Frontier's Standby Fares, CAB Docket No. 16873, CAB Order No. E-23128 (18 Jan.
1966).
8 ln Summer Excursion Fares Case, 11 C.A.B. 218 (1950), the Board rejected the argument
that its function of promotion is paramount. It found that fares of a promotional character must
be reasonable and not unjustly discriminatory.
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Procedure - Forum Non Conveniens -
Foreign Corporations
Scottish Air International, Inc. [hereinafter Scottish] is a New York
corporation formed to syndicate the United States capital contributed to
the formation of Caledonian Airways/Prestwick, Ltd. [hereinafter Cale-
donian] a United Kingdom corporation.' Caledonian maintains an office
in New York City and derives substantial revenues from its flights to
and from New York. Scottish commenced a stockholder's derivative action
in the New York state courts against Caledonian and some of its directors
for alleged fraudulent transactions, and the defendants removed to the
federal courts. The defendants then moved to dismiss the action brought
by Scottish on the ground of forum non conveniens. Caledonian argued
that all material witnesses were in the United Kingdom, that United King-
dom law applied to all relevant issues, and that plaintiffs had a convenient
forum in the United Kingdom. The presiding judge denied the motion
to dismiss, and the defendants petitioned the court of appeals for a writ
of prohibition or mandamus, or both, against the presiding judge in the
district court. Held: A refusal to dismiss a stockholder's derivative suit
against a United Kingdom air carrier on the basis of forum non con-
venens was not an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court
judge. The court based its decision upon a finding that there were sub-
stantial New York facets of the business, and also that Caledonian came
here to obtain the capital on which Scottish's claims are based. Thomson v.
Palmieri, 35 5 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1966).
The doctrine of forum non conveniens originated in Scotland as a
rule of refusal to hear cases when the ends of justice would be best served
by trial in another forum.' The courts of the United States adopted the
term forum non conveniens as requiring "the dismissal of a case because
the forum chosen by the plaintiff is so completely inappropriate and in-
convenient that it is better to stop the litigation in the place where brought
and let it start all over again somewhere else."3 When the change of
venue section, 1404 (a), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was en-
acted,' it was mistakenly construed by some courts to be a codification of
'There are over twenty-five stockholders in Scottish, and Scottish's investment in Caledonian
was approximately $45,000. Scottish held only non-voting stock, and originally it held approxi-
mately thirty-five percent of the total stock of Caledonian, but at the time of the derivative action
its equity had been reduced to approximately twelve percent.
aLoftus v. Lee, 308 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Mo. 1958). See 24 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 208-09
(1955) and 56 YALE L.J. 1234 (1946) for historical development of forum non conveniens.
'All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 1952). The Supreme
Court approved this definition in Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31 (1955).4 FED. R. Civ. P., § 1404(a), 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) (1964):
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
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the forum non conveniens doctrine.' If section 1404 (a) had effectively
eliminated forum non conveniens as a separate doctrine, the courts would
be deprived of the inherent power to refuse jurisdiction in cases which
should have been brought in a foreign jurisdiction, since 1404 (a) requires
that the case be transferred to some other federal venue.6 The United
States Supreme Court clarified the misconception in Norwood v. Kirk-
patrick by citing with approval from the court of appeals decision in All
States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli:
The forum non conveniens doctrine is quite different from Section 1404 (a)
.... It is quite naturally subject to careful limitations for it not only denies
the plaintiff the generally accorded privilege of bringing the action where
he chooses, but makes it possible for him to lose out completely through
the running of the statute of limitations in the forum finally deemed appro-
priate. Section 1404 (a) avoids this latter danger. Its words should be con-
sidered for what they say, not with preconceived limitations derived from
the forum non conveniens doctrine.'
Before the enactment of 1404 (a), the Supreme Court set out the basic
considerations in determining when to apply the doctrine of forum non
conveniens: (1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (2) avail-
ability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, (3)
possibility of a view of premises if a view would be appropriate to the
action, and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive." The burden of establishing that the action
should be transferred is on the moving party under both 1404(a) and
forum non conveniens." In both instances the decision whether to transfer
or to dismiss is in the discretion of the district court to be exercised in
the light of all the circumstances of the case.1 The ultimate concern of
the court under the forum non conveniens doctrine is whether litigation
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought.5 Collins v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956), petition for cert. dismissed
per stipulation, 352 U.S. 802 (1956).
0 FED. R. Civ. P., S 1404(a), 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) (1964). See DeSairigne
v. Gould, 83 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 177 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 912 (1950). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that § 1404(a) did not
limit the application of forum non conveniens to cases which would be capable of being transferred
from one federal district to another, and this decision was followed in Latimer v. S/A Industrias
Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 91 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). This case involved a Brazilian corporation
engaged in manufacturing exclusively for South American trade. The corporation made no sales and
delivered no goods in the United States. The corporation did, however, purchase equipment and
materials in the United States through a purchasing agent in New York and maintained a drawing
account in a New York bank. The defendant terminated the contract and the plaintiff sued for
breach in New York. The defendant moved for the court to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens, and the court refused even though: the defendant had no office in New York; plaintiff
was a citizen of Georgia; all of defendant's witnesses lived in Brazil; and the witnesses spoke only
Portuguese.
'196 F.2d 1010 (3d.Cir. 1952).
'349 U.S. 29, 31 (1955). See also United States v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 87 F.
Supp. 962 (N.D. Ill. 1950), holding that the courts may refuse to exercise jurisdiction under S
1404(a) for less impelling reasons than under the former doctrine of forum non conveniens, since
under § 1404(a) the court merely transfers the case, whereas under forum non conveniens the
court dismisses the action or refuses to exercise its jurisdiction.
sGulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).0United States v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 87 F. Supp. 962 (N.D, Ill. 1950).
" Christopher v. American News Co., 176 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1949).
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in the forum will best serve the convenience of parties and the ends of
justice."2
Prior to section 1404(a), the federal courts seem to have been less de-
manding in the requisites necessary to refuse jurisdiction on the ground
of forum non conveniens when the suits involved American citizens from
different states than the courts are today in suits where the only other
proper forum is in a foreign country." This is because the courts are re-
luctant to require an American citizen and plaintiff to bring his suit in a
foreign jurisdiction."4
Another factor which the courts consider in determining whether to
dismiss a cause because of forum non conveniens is the waning internal
affairs rule. The following two cases, dealing with the internal affairs rule,
involve corporate defendants domiciled in a state other than the one in
which the suit was brought. The treatment by these courts pointing out
the decline of the internal affairs rule as it bears upon the forum non
conveniens doctrine is also applicable to the situation in which the corporate
defendant is domiciled in a foreign country. In both situations, if the
court refuses to dismiss, it is exercising its jurisdiction over a defendant
corporation domiciled outside its jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court in Williams v. Green Bay &q W.R.R." established
that there is little basis in federal law for the dismissal of an action merely
because it involves the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. The
plaintiffs in Williams, who were residents of New York, brought suit in
New York against a Wisconsin corporation to recover amounts alleged to
be due and payable on its debentures. Application of Wisconsin law was
necessary in order to obtain a proper interpretation of the corporation's
debenture covenant. The Supreme Court reversed a prior dismissal by
the trial court based on forum non conveniens and remanded the case to
be tried on its merits. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous
court, indicated that forum non conveniens would justify the dismissal of
a case involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation in only two
instances: (1) where the relief sought is so extensive or would require
such detailed and continuing supervision that the federal court would be
seriously handicapped in providing an effective remedy, and (2) where
trial in the federal district court would be oppressive or vexatious to the
defendant.
The year following its decision in Williams, the Supreme Court decided
Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mitt. Cas. Co.' That case involved a
derivative action brought in the federal district court in New York by a
New York policyholder against an Illinois mutual insurance company and
12 Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947).1 3 Compare Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946) with Latimer v. S/A
Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 91 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
"'Burt v. Isthmus Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 922 (1955)
(both parties were American citizens); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1956); and The Saudades, 67 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Pa. 1946).11326 U.S. 549 (1946).
10330 U.S. 518 (1947).
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an allegedly unfaithful officer domiciled in Illinois. Although this was not
an internal affairs case, the court declared:
There is no rule of law, moreover, which requires dismissal of a suitor
from the forum on a mere showing that the trial will involve issues which
relate to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. That is one, but only
one, factor which may show convenience of parties or witnesses, the appro-
priateness of trial in a forum familiar with the law of the corporation's
domicile, and the enforceability of the remedy if one be granted. But the
ultimate inquiry is where trial will best serve the convenience of the parties
and the ends of justice."
From the foregoing it may be concluded that the internal affairs rule is
an important consideration only when there is doubt as to whether the
court can give an effective remedy within its jurisdictional limits and
powers.
Though the principle of forum non conveniens is applicable to cases in
which the alternative forum is in a foreign country, the added circum-
stance that an American plaintiff will be deprived of an American forum
is given considerable weight by the courts in deciding whether to apply
the doctrine. In Burt v. Isthmus Dey. Co." both parties were American
citizens, but all of the defendant's witnesses were in Mexico, and Mexican
law applied. When the federal district court dismissed on the basis of
forum non conveniens, the appellate court reversed, stating that it had
found no case where a resident citizen suing in his own right had been
sent to a foreign court. The court felt that it would be inconsistent with
the purpose and function of the federal courts to hold that a court could
decline to hear a case and in effect force a citizen to go to a foreign coun-
try to find redress for an alleged wrong. Courts should require evidence
of unusually extreme circumstances and must be thoroughly convinced
that material injustice is present before exercising any discretion to deny
a citizen access to United States courts. Another district court stated
that mere inconvenience to the foreign defendant is not a sufficient basis
for refusing jurisdiction," and the Supreme Court has stated that it is
necessary to show that plaintiff's choice of forum was prompted by an
intent to vex or harass defendant"° in order to acquire a dismissal on the
ground of forum non conveniens.' Moreover, Judge Learned Hand stated
1Id. at 527. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117(e), comment (d)
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1957), p. 69:
At one time, it was customary for the courts to evince strong reluctance to inter-
fere with the "internal affairs" of a corporation that had been incorporated in another
state .... This doctrine enjoys less force at the present time. The fact that the suit
involves the internal affairs of a foreign corporation is held by the courts today to
be but one of the factors to be considered in determining whether the forum selected
is an appropriate one for the suit. This factor moreover will rarely be of crucial
significance unless the nature of the relief demanded would require the court to exer-
cise detailed and continued supervision over the corporation's affairs.
1"218 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 922 (1955).
"The Saudades, 67 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
"°Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Wheeler v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins
DeFer Francias (French Nat'l R.R.s), 108 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
21 In Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir. 1956), the court stated:
"Whether jurisdiction should be declined is determined by balancing conveniences, but the plaintiff's
choice of forum will not be disturbed unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant."
See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504-09 (1947).
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as dicta in United States Merchants and Shippers' Ins. Co. v. A/S Den
Norske Afrika Og Australie Line2 that a citizen's right of access to a
federal court is conclusive against remission to a foreign jurisdiction under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens when he sues in his own right. This
attitude on the part of the judiciary is often justified on the basis that a
refusal to exercise jurisdiction might adversely affect the plaintiff's sub-
stantive rights, and a change of forum should not alter the rights of the
parties.' However, it has been stated by several courts that an American
citizen does not have an absolute right to sue in an American court."
Stewart v. Godoy-Sayan' is one of the few cases in which the judiciary
has dismissed an action by an American citizen against a defendant domi-
ciled in a foreign country. In that case residents of New York brought
suit in a New York federal district court for damages allegedly resulting
from defendant's looting of a Cuban corporation of which plaintiffs were
stockholders. The plaintiffs had purchased their stock in Cuba. All wit-
nesses and documents necessary for trial were in Cuba, and American
law was not involved. The only connection between the suit and any
jurisdiction other than Cuba was that the plaintiffs, as stockholders, lived
in the United States. The court held that the mere fact that the plaintiffs
were local residents did not require the court to entertain jurisdiction
because suit was brought on behalf of the corporation and not in the
plaintiffs' own right. The Supreme Court in DeSairigne v. Gould' refused
to review a dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens in a deriva-
tive action. The dismissal was based upon the following factors: the in-
ternal affairs of a foreign corporation were involved; all relevant books
and records were located in the foreign domicile; and only foreign law
was applicable.
In the instant case, Caledonian had a full-time office and staff in New
York City to handle its many charter flights between New York and the
United Kingdom. The officers and directors of Caledonian frequently came
to the United States on business, and the corporation retained a Wash-
ington attorney to represent it before the Civil Aeronautics Board and in
other matters in the United States. The individual defendants, F. Hope
and A. Thomson, were officers and directors of Caledonian and were
charged by Scottish with alleged fraudulent transactions involving Cale-
donian. The individual defendants were personally served in New York
while on one of their business trips to the United States.
In refusing to dismiss under forum non conveniens, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit placed considerable emphasis upon Cale-
donian's numerous contacts with the forum. Even though the suit in-
22 65 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1933).
' Williamson v. Palmer, 181 Misc. 610, 43 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1943); 50 COLUM. L. REV. 236
(1950).
" United States Merchants and Shippers' Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske Afrika Og Australie Line,
65 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1933); DeSairigne v. Gould, 83 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 177
F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 912 (1950).
23 153 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
" 83 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 177 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1949), cerl. denied, 339
U.S. 912 (1950).
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volved the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, the court had power
to grant effective relief since it could exercise its power over that portion
of the defendant's business carried out within the forum. The court in
Thomson distinguished DeSairigne on the basis that, in the latter case,
the defendant had only minimal contacts with the forum state while in
Thomson Calendonia had actively engaged in business in the forum state
and had sought capital there. The Stewart case is, a fortiori, distinguishable
from Thomson in that there was no connection at all between the defend-
ant and the United States in Stewart since it did no business in the United
States, and the stock was purchased in Cuba.
Thus, the courts today seem to place emphasis upon balancing the in-
convenience to the defendant who is domiciled in another country against
the inherent fear that depriving a resident plaintiff of a local forum and
forcing him into a foreign jurisdiction will result in a loss of some of his
substantive rights."' In light of this principle the courts consider the follow-
ing factors: (1) whether it is the intent of the plaintiff to vex or harass
the defendant by his choice of forum, (2) in derivative actions, whether
plaintiff's interest is substantial, (3) whether the defendant has sufficient
contacts with the forum, and (4) whether the court can effect an ade-
quate remedy if its accepts jurisdiction. Once the trial judge has balanced
the interests of the parties and the other factors to be considered and made
his decision, it is unlikely that any appellate court will reverse that de-
cision, since it is discretionary in nature. 8 However, it does appear that
an appellate court would be more likely to reverse a court's refusal to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens than a court's
refusal to dismiss simply because the scales seem to tip more heavily in
favor of an American plaintiff whose rights may be infringed.
William C. Strock
27 Shulman v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS S 117(e), comment (b) (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1957), p. 67.
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Patent Law - NASA Contracts - Commissioner's Discretion
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 19581 forbids the issuance
of a patent to any applicant other than the Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration [hereinafter Administrator and
NASA] if the Commissioner of Patents [hereinafter Commissioner] de-
termines that the invention has possible utility in the conduct of aero,-
nautical and space activities unless such applicant files a two-part state-
ment with the Commissioner within thirty days after formal request of
such statement. This statement must contain a description of the circum-
stances surrounding the invention and its relationship to any work done
under contract with NASA. The Commissioner advised appellant on 15
March 1963 that his patent application had been found allowable,' but
since the invention appeared to have utility to NASA, the applicant was
required to file a statement as required by Section 2457(c) of the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Act of 195 8.' On 25 April the appellant filed
two statements' which read identically, "At the time I conceived and
reduced to practice the invention which is the subject matter of said appli-
cation I was not performing any work under any contract with the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration." The Patent Office notified
appellant on 31 May that the statements were unacceptable because the
full facts concerning the circumstances under which the invention was
made were not set forth.' Having received no reply to his informal re-
quest, the Commissioner on 30 September issued a formal request. On 12
December 1963 the appellant was notified that the thirty-day statutory
period had run and that no patent could be issued on his application. After
unsuccessfully attempting to have the Commissioner revive the application,
the appellant instituted suit in the United States District Court for the
172 Stat. 426 (1958), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-76 (1964).
272 Stat. 435 (1958), 42 U.S.C. § 2457(c) (1964):
No patent may be issued to any applicant other than the Administrator [NASA
Administrator] for any invention which appears to the Commissioner of Patents to
have significant utility in the conduct of aeronautical and space activities unless the
applicant files with the Commissioner, with the application or within thirty days
after request therefor by the Commissioner, a written statement executed under oath
setting forth the full facts concerning the circumstances under which such invention
was made and stating the relationship (if any) of such invention to the performance
of any work under any contract of the Administration. Copies of each such statement
and application to which it relates shall be transmitted forthwith by the Commissioner
to the Administrator.
a This was a determination by the Patent Examiner that the subject matter of the application
was patentable under the Patent Act of 1952. 66 Stat. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1964).
"This notification was not a "formal notice" which would have started the statutory thirty
day time limit. However, it advised appellant that if such a formal notice were sent there was no
provision in § 2457 for the extension of the time limit.
aTwo statements were submitted since there were co-inventors. Appellant had acquired the
rights of the inventors by assignment.
' This correspondence also informed appellant that a formal request would be issued unless
supplemental statements correcting the defects were filed within thirty days.
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District of Columbia to compel the Commissioner to restore the applica-
tion to pendency. He asserted that the Commissioner had acted ultra vires
in ruling on the sufficiency of the statements. The court granted the gov-
ernment's motion for summary judgment, holding that "when a statute
provides that a statement be composed of two parts, and the statements
actually filed include only one of those two parts, those statements are
clearly insufficient as a matter of law."' Held, affirmed: The Commissioner's
duty under section 2457(c) is not merely ministerial, but requires that
he pass on the sufficiency of statements filed pursuant to that section.
Cadillac Gage Co. v. Brenner, 363 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The purpose of Section 2457 of the National Aeronautics and Space Act
of 1958 is to grant the federal government an exclusive property interest
in any invention made in the performance of work under a contract with
NASA8 and, further, to assure the Administrator the opportunity to
assert this interest.! Pursuant to this statutory purpose, all contracts entered
into with NASA must contain a provision obligating the other party to
submit to the Administrator a written report concerning any inventions
or improvements made in connection with the contract. As a secondary
protection, the Commissioner of Patents is directed not to issue a patent
for an invention which appears to be of utility to NASA unless: (1) the
applicant has filed within thirty days of request a statement describing the
circumstances under which the invention was made and the relationship
(if any) of the invention to work done under contract with NASA, and
(2) the Administrator has failed to request that the patent issue to him
within ninety days after receipt of the application and statement from the
Commissioner." Thus, within the scheme of the act the Commissioner
represents merely a conduit through which the Administrator is assured
an opportunity to assert the government's property interest in an inven-
tion conceived pursuant to a NASA contract.
Upon examination of the limited duty imposed by this act on the
Commissioner, it is evident that it is within his discretion to categorize a
particular invention as having utility to the NASA program; however,
it seems less evident whether his function of requesting a statement from
an applicant and transmitting that statement along with the patent appli-
cation to the Administrator is discretionary or ministerial in nature. The
Supreme Court has declared that "the word discretion as used in statutory
... grants of authority means that the recipient must exercise his author-
ity according to his own understanding and conscience."11 In contrast, a
grant of ministerial power is understood to impose an absolute duty to
perform a certain act under conditions specified, not being dependent upon
'Cadillac Gage Co. v. Brenner, 247 F. Supp. 62, 64 (D.D.C. 1965).872 Stat. 435 (1958), 42 U.S.C. § 2457 (a), (b), & (c) (1964).
972 Stat. 435 (1958), 42 U.S.C. § 2457 (b) & (c) (1964).
10The statute, in addition, provides for protection of the interests of the private inventor.
Subsection (d) of § 2457 grants a right to the applicant to have any controversy with respect to
the validity of the Administrator's claim of title to his invention settled by the Board of Patent
Interferences, and the Board's determination is expressly subject to judicial review.
': Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
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the officer's judgment or discretion." Thus, the Commissioner's specified,
regimented statutory duty of requesting a statement from an applicant
and transmitting that statement and the patent application to the Adminis-
trator is apparently ministerial rather than discretionary.
The statutory scheme, however, seems to require the Commissioner to
determine whether the statement is prima facie adequate before trans-
mittal to the Administrator. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that
the mere fact that it is necessary to exercise a degree of discretion to de-
termine if the facts or conditions exist which require an administrator to
act does not convert a ministerial act into one of discretion." In Young-
blood v. United States14 a state statute required that notice of a federal
tax lien describe the land on which the lien was claimed, and the court
held that the county registrar of deeds (a ministerial official) was not
required to record a notice which did not prima facie have such a discrip-
tion.' By analogy, though the Commissioner's duty in transmitting the
statement to the Administrator is ministerial in nature, it is still proper
for the Commissioner to exercise his discretion to the extent of determin-
ing whether the statement submitted by an applicant is prima facie a
proper statement.
In the instant case the statements submitted by the applicant were
clearly insufficient because they revealed nothing about the circumstances
surrounding the invention. Accordingly, the district court dispensed with
appellant's claim on the ground that the statements as a matter of law
did not comply with the requirements of the statute. Thus, the district
court held that the Commissioner has the right to refuse to transmit a
statement which prima facie fails to comply with the statute. In affirming,
the court of appeals stated, "[T]he Commissioner's duty under § 2457 (c)
was not merely ministerial, but requires that he pass on the sufficiency of
the statements.""' The court's language is broad enough to allow the
Commissioner the discretion in each case to determine whether a state-
ment contains an adequate description of the "full facts."'" It is submitted
12 1 Am. JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 83 at 878 (1962).
"s Independent School Dist. of Danbury v. Christiansen, 49 N.W.2d 263 (1951). See generally
1 Am. JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 84 at 879 (1962).
14 141 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1944).
"To the same effect see State v. Shaver, 173 N.E.2d 758 (1961), where the court said that a
ministerial officer "may exercise some discretion and is not absolutely required to accept, record,
and index every instrument presented to him." Id. at 760. Accord, Luther v. Banks, 111 Ga. 374,
36 S.E. 826 (1900) and United States v. Bell, 127 Fed. 1002 (1904).
"Cadillac Gage Co. v. Brenner, 363 F.2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Note that the court also stated
that if the duty were not interpreted as discretionary the Commissioner would be required to
transmit all statements to the Administrator. This is clearly a misinterpretation of the scope of
ministerial duties.
" The statute requires that each statement set forth the "full facts" concerning the circum-
stances under which such invention was made. If it were within the Commissioner's discretion to
determine whether a statement, in addition to being prima facie sufficient, sets forth the full facts
of a particular case, he would conceivably have the power to refuse a patent because in his judgment
the statement either failed to set forth complete facts or stated untrue facts. This would mean
that an applicant could be permanently denied a patent on an otherwise patentable invention with-
out the right to have the Commissioner's discretionary determination reviewed, except as to an
abuse of that discretion. In contrast, S 2457(d) provides for review of any further action on the
patent once the patent and the statement have been submitted to the Administrator. Further, the
Commissioner should not have the final authority to determine, beyond prima facie adequacy, wheth-
er additional facts are necessary for the Administrator to make a determination.
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that the statute confers no authority upon the Commissioner except that
of acting as a conduit through which the Administrator is afforded the
opportunity to assert the government's property interest in devices in-
vented in connection with a NASA contract. Thus, while the summary
judgment in the instant case was proper because the statement was in-
sufficient as a matter of law, the language of the appellate court is broad
enough to support an action by the Commissioner which is outside the
scope of his statutory authority.
Allen C. Rudy, Jr.
Sonic Booms - Ground Damage - Theories Of Recovery
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the detrimental side effects caused by sonic booms have not
presented serious problems for land owners to date, as supersonic transport
aircraft come into widespread commercial use, substantial litigation over
ground damage caused by these booms will probably arise. Recovery for
damages resulting solely from the noise accompanying the boom does not
seem to require theories of liability different from those which have already
developed in litigation over subsonic jet aircraft noise. More difficult prob-
lems are presented when the attempt is made to devise a theory of recovery
for actual physical damage to property.
Apparently, widespread use of supersonic commercial aircraft is just
around the corner, as production schedules for these aircraft continue to
be met. The Concorde program, a joint venture sponsored by the French
and British governments for the development and production of a super-
sonic transport aircraft, has been in operation since 1961. By late-October,
1965, the producers had received fifty-two orders for the Concorde, seven-
teen of them from United States airlines.' At the same time they reported
that they were on schedule for the first flight to take place in March,
1968, certification to occur early in 1971, and airline service to start later
that year.' Twelve Concordes were scheduled for delivery to airlines in
1971, with further production to continue at the rate of three planes per
month."
The Federal Aviation Agency, as coordinator of a similar American
program, has received bids for production of a supersonic transport from
Boeing and Lockheed and is expected to let a contract by about 1 January,
1967.' By late-October, 1965, there had been ninety-five deposits of
$100,000i each made in connection with an order for one of the pro-
posed American aircraft, forty-four of which were placed by domestic
airlines.' The present schedule for the American program calls for the first
prototype flight in 1970, followed by delivery in 1974.'
II. DAMAGING EFFECTS OF SONIC BOOMS
In order to establish that a particular sonic boom was the proximate
' Delay Hampers U.S. Mach 2.7 Transport, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 25 Oct. 1965,
pp. 135, 139.
2Concorde Hews to Schedule for First Flight, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 25 Oct.
1965, p. 130. In April, 1966, production of the Concorde was running ahead of schedule, with the
flight of the first prototype to be made in February, 1968. Coleman, Concorde Production Ahead
of Timetable, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 4 April 1966, pp, 40, 41.
a Coleman, supra note 2, at 41.
4SST Prototype Contracts Due in January, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 7 March 1966,
p. 313.
a Delay Hampers U.S. Mach 2.7 Transport, supra note 1, at 139.
6 SST Prototype Contracts Due in January, supra note 4, at 313.
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cause of the damage in any given case, it is necessary to consider the extent
of damage that a boom can cause. As late as 1962, through tests conducted
by Air Force scientists, it was claimed that 70 lbs. of pressure per sq. ft. is
required to damage even flimsy structures, and that the highest recorded
sonic boom pressure was 33 lbs. per sq. ft., which was registered under
test conditions on the top of a mountain where the aircraft was only 280
feet distant.' The Air Force concluded that structural damage to property
was relatively impossible where overpressures' ranged from 2 to 5 lbs. per
sq. ft. (the range of overpressures produced by supersonic training ma-
neuvers), and that plaster and window damage could occur only in isolated
cases where a stress was pre-existent due to a flaw in the glass or in its
installation. However, the Federal Aviation Agency's Office of Plans has
since reported that overpressures of 2 to 2.9 lbs. per sq. ft. cause con-
siderable damage to glass and plaster, while overpressures of 2.9 to 4.9
lbs. per sq. ft. cause widespread window and plaster damage, as well as
minor structural damage to frames and walls." Neither of these two posi-
tions has received wholesale acquiescence, the result being that there is
still considerable disagreement as to whether sonic booms can cause struc-
tural damage."
III. RECOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Until now, most of the actions involving sonic boom damages have
been confined to claims against the government under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and to claims based on casualty insurance policies against the
claimant's insurer." In most instances where government-owned military
aircraft have caused sonic boom damage, the government has paid for any
property damage (mostly broken windows and cracked plaster) without
the necessity of the claimant's bringing any legal action. Where there
have been large scale experiments13 or exercises,14 the government has
agreed before the flights took place to pay for any sonic damage actually
caused by such flights.
When the government receives a complaint, it first sends out a letter
indicating its position that the possibility of boom damage in any case is
extremely remote. This eliminates approximately eighty-three percent of
the claims."1 If the property owner persists, a check is made to determine
if a sonic boom occurred near the time and place of the alleged damage.
If not, no further steps are taken. If so, investigators are sent to inspect
7 Rottman and Phillips, The Sonic Boon, Problem-One Judge Advocate Office Solution, JAG
Bull., March-April 1962, pp. 10, 12. These assertions are still made in form letters sent out by
the Air Force in response to sonic boom complaints.
'The scientific term "overpressure" is one used to denote the intensity of air pressure increase
above the pressure under normal atmosphric conditions.
" Rottman & Phillips, supra note 7, at 12.
"°McKinley, Response of Glass in Windows to Sonic Booms, 4 Materials Res. & Stand. $94, 595
(1964).
" Lundberg, Supersonic Boom, The Rotarian, Nov. 1966, p. 24.
"
1 Varner, Legal Aspects of The Sonic Boom, 23 ALA. LAW. 342, 345 (1962).
1l Power, Some Results of Oklahoma City Sonic Boom Tests, 4 Materials Res. & Stand. 617
(1964).
"4 Rottman & Phillips, supra note 7, at 10.
151d. at 10, 11.
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the damaged property, and if all that is found is minor glass and brick-a-
brac damage, the government will normally satisfy the claim. However,
the government is extremely reluctant to pay for structural damage to
property, and according to government experience, large plaster cracks
do not ordinarily occur in the absence of accompanying glass damage. If
suit is brought, the common practice is for the government to admit
liability for damage caused by the boom, but to question the extent of
damage proximately caused.'
If it is necessary to bring an action against the government, either of
two basic approaches can be pursued. Claims brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. section 2672, are determined administratively,
while actions brought under 28 U.S.C. section 1346 are pursued in the
federal courts. Section 1346 gives the district court concurrent juris-
diction with the Court of Claims over claims for money damages for
injury to or loss of property, or personal injury or death "caused by the
negligence or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment."" In filing
a claim for personal injury, one should frame his pleadings on a theory
of negligence or trespass, since section 2680 (h) exempts the federal gov-
ernment from liability for assault and battery.
IV. INSURANCE COVERAGE
For the property owner to establish his insurance company's liability
for damage done by a sonic boom, he generally must show that it comes
under one of three clauses in the policy: "all-risk" coverage, "aircraft
damage" coverage, or explosion coverage." "All-risk" coverage, which is
contained in many builder's risk policies and in some homeowner's poli-
cies, extends to any casualty and would certainly cover damages caused
by sonic booms. In seeking to recover under the other types of insurance
coverage, a plaintiff must be cognizant of various well established prin-
ciples of insurance law. The language of an insurance policy should be
given its plain, ordinary and popular interpretation, not a narrow or
technical construction.' Furthermore, imprecise or doubtful language in
an insurance contract should be construed against the insurer.' Doubtful
language is also to be construed in the light of the objects intended to be
accomplished thereby."
'"Information obtained from officers in the claims section of the Judge Advocate General's
Office, Carswell Air Force Base, Ft. Worth, Texas.
'"36 Stat. 1093 (1911), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)(b); Under § 2675(a) & (b), a claimant
can either abandon his claim which is before a governmental agency and file under S 1346 or he
can appeal the decision of such agency to either the district court or the Court of Claims.
,s Varner, supra note 12, at 346.
"Ward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 241 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1957); Franklin Life Ins. Co.
v. Lewis, 36 Ala. App. 313, 55 So. 2d 518 (1951); National Life & Acc. Ins. v. Davies, 34 Ala. App.
290, 39 So. 2d 697 (1949); and Roma Wine Co. v. Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 2d
455, 88 P.2d 260, 262 (1939).
'0 12 Alabama Digest 423-28; National Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 39 Ala. App. 199, 96 So. 2d 708
(1957).
"Miller v. Robertson, 266 U.S. 243 (1924); Allied Magnet Wire Corp. v. Tuttle, 199 Ind.
166, 154 N.E. 480 (1926); McGowan Lumber & Export Co. v. Camp Lumber Co., 16 Ala. App.
283, 77 So. 433 (1917); and White v. Breen, 19 So. 59 (Ala. 1894).
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A. Aircraft Damage Coverage
Most "aircraft damage" clauses restrict coverage to "direct loss resulting
from actual physical contact of an aircraft with the property covered
(thereunder) ," and specifically cover losses caused by objects falling from
aircraft."" It does not seem that damage from a sonic boom would be
covered by a contract with such language, since there is no physical con-
tact by the aircraft with the insured property. Even if a sonic boom were
construed as "falling from the aircraft," it could not be considered an
"object."
Nevertheless, the rule of liberal construction in favor of the insured has
been successfully utilized in at least one instance in order to gain recovery
under an "aircraft damage" clause. In a 1958 Texas case, Alexander v.
Fireman's Ins. Co.," the plaintiff brought suit for the damages caused by
a military jet aircraft, which, while flying at a supersonic speed at a low
altitude, had unseated the girders beneath his frame and metal building,
thereby capsizing and extensively damaging it. The Texas court, in con-
struing an alternate "aircraft damage" clause which provided that "in-
surance provided under the extended provisions shall include direct loss
by . . .aircraft" and that "loss by aircraft shall include direct loss by
falling aircraft, or objects falling therefrom ... "held that damage from
a sonic boom was a direct loss by aircraft, and that other provisions of the
policy did not exclude such coverage."'
B. Explosion Coverage
Where an "all-risk" clause is not written into the contract, and where
recovery cannot be obtained under a restricted "aircraft damage" clause,
the plaintiff who seeks damages for sonic booms may contend that it re-
sulted from a new form of explosion, and that the owner is therefore
protected by the explosion clause of his policy. There have only been
two reported cases to date which have considered this possibility.
The contention that a sonic boom is an explosion is strengthened by the
language of the American Bar Association Journal' to the effect that a
sonic boom is an explosion, and also by the fact that the Air Force dic-
tionary refers to the sonic boom as being explosive." The Texas court in
Alexander rejected the contention advanced by the American Bar Asso-
ciation Journal that a sonic boom should be judicially noticed as an ex-
plosion;"' however, it recognized the possibility that in future times our
courts may take such judicial notice."
The court in Bear Bros., Inc. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters29
22 Varner, supra note 12, at 346.
2317 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
"id. at 754.
13 4 4 A.B.A.J. 216 (1958).
Varner, suPra note 12, at 347.
27Alexander v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 317 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). The court
said it lacked the requisite "verifiable certainty" to take judicial notice of such a fact.
"'Since the court refused to take judicial notice that a sonic boom is an explosion, the plaintiff
then had the burden of proving such fact if he wanted to recover on that basis. The plaintiff
tendered no proof of such fact, so neither the court nor the jury made any determination.
"6 Av. Cas. 5 17,497 (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1959).
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apparently followed the views expressed by the defendant's experts in
holding that the explosion clause did not cover damage caused by a sonic
boom.' Unfortunately, however, the questions presented became moot
because the plaintiff settled with the federal government pending the
appeal."
Determination of whether or not a sonic boom falls within the general
classification of an explosion may very well depend upon the particular
definition accepted by the courts. An "explosion" has been defined in some
jurisdictions as simply a "violent explosion with noise, following the sud-
den production of great pressure," and as "a violent expansion of some
force, accompanied by a noise,"a and as "a violent expansion with noise
following the production of a great pressure or sudden release of pres-
sure.""
There are two general theories as to the nature of sonic booms. One
group, whose theory is more widely accepted, explains the phenomenon
in terms of sound waves," while a second group adheres to a theory based
upon the movement of air particles.' There is, however, uniform agree-
ment among both groups of experts that the sonic boom is a pressure wave
accompanied by a noise."7 Thus, the scientific definition of an explosion
seems to coincide with the general definitions of the word "explosion."
Both definitions include a violent expansion accompanied by noise which
follows the sudden production of great pressure. Moreover, the varied
occurrences already held to have been explosions indicate the judicial
tendency against an extremely limited or rigid classification.3
30 Varner, supra note 12, at 350.
"1 Ibid.
'2Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 830, 834 (D.D.C. 1955).
'Sweeney v. Blue Anchor Beverage Co., 325 Pa. 216, 189 Atl. 331, 335 (1937).
14 Lever Bros Co. v. Atlas Assur. Co., 131 F.2d 770 (7th Cit. 1942).
3Varner, supra note 12, at 342; Lyster, The Nature of Sonic Booms, 4 Materials Res. & Stand.
582 (1964).
36 Varner, supra note 12, at 342.
37 Id. at 344.
"' Examples of some of the occurrences which have been so held are: the rapid expansion of
air in a room, caused by fire therein, which caused the walls to be blown out, Roma Wine Co. v.
Hardware Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 2d 455, 88 P.2d 260, 262 (1939); the bursting of
frozen pipes and radiators, Bower v. Aetna Ins. Co., 54 F. Supp. 897, 898 (N.D. Tex. 1944); the
omission of refrigerating ammonia through packing around the valves accompanied by a hissing
noise, the shooting of a cap pistol, or the blowing of a cap off of a soda pop, medicine, or vinegar
bottle, Crombie & Co. v. Employer's Fire Ins. Co., 250 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959);
the rupture of a cottonsced oil tank or a grain storage tank due to expansion from fermentation
of other cause, Chicago & R.I.R.R. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 180 Kan. 730, 308 P.2d 119 (1957); Hart-
Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 293 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Mo. 1956); and Lever Bros.
Co. v. Atlas Assur. Co., 131 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1942). Corpus Juris Secundum discusses "explosion"
in the following manner:
The word is variously used and is not one that admits of exact definition, having
no fixed and definite meaning either in ordinary speech or in law; but is said to be a
general term, unlimited in its application. Its general characteristics may be described,
but the exact facts which constitute what we call by that name are not susceptible
of such statement as will always distinguish the occurrences. It may, and often does,
vary in degree of intensity and in the vehemence of the report, and it is not always
due to the presence of fire; indeed, it may result from decomposition or chemical
action . .. the true meaning of the word in each particular case must be settled, not
by any fixed standard, or accurate measurement, but by the common experience
and notions of men in matters of the sort. It has been said that the term is to be
construed in its popular sense, and as understood by ordinary men, and not by
scientific men. (Emphasis added.) The word "explosion" is defined in a general way,
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A controversy will probably arise as to whether expert testimony should
be used to determine whether or not a sonic boom is, or should be treated
the same as, an explosion. In view of the insurance principle that the
language of a policy should be given its plain, ordinary and popular
meaning according to the common experience of ordinary men, it seems
that technical experts should not be allowed to conclude whether a sonic
boom is an explosion under the terms of an insurance policy. Their testi-
mony should be limited in its extent to the physical effects of a sonic boom,
and the jury should be allowed to conclude whether a sonic boom, as
described by the experts, comes within the general definition of an "ex-
plosion."
V. SUITS AGAINST COMMERCIAL AIRLINES
With the advent of commercial supersonic flight, substantial damage to
property is likely to result, and the airlines will be confronted with the
decision of whether to pay for all proximately caused damage. If the
airlines decide to contest liability, the property owner will be faced
with the problem of establishing a theory of liability upon which to base
his claim. Three main theories can be argued: (1) negligence or fault;
(2) strict liability on the ground that public policy demands that the
airline should be an insurer of any injury proximately resulting from the
operation of an extra-hazardous activity; and (3) strict liability based on
an analogy to the blasting laws.""
A. Negligence
Now that it is clearly established that sonic booms can cause physical
damage to property, the reasonably prudent aviator must exercise a much
higher standard of care because the extent of forseeable harm is much
broader. The negligent act itself might be the flying at too great a speed
at a low altitude, the rapid execution of horizontal turns, or too rapid a
descent at supersonic speeds. If the plaintiff could not ascertain the exact
reason for the production of the damaging overpressures, he would prob-
ably find it beneficial to invoke the seemingly applicable doctrine of "res
ipsa loquitur." Once it is proven that the damage was caused by a sonic
as meaning a sudden and rapid combustion, causing violent expansion of the air, and
accompanied by a report ...." 35 C.J.S., Explosion at 243-44.
For examples of scientific definitions that would seem to exclude or make very difficult inclusion of
sonic booms, see Varner, supra note 12, at 348-49. David Bland, in his article Pffft! Pop! Or Pow!-
It's an Explosion, 33 INs. COUNSEL J. 369 (1966), after criticizing the courts' obscure treatment
of the word, offers a good discussion of various definitions proposed by some insurance experts, as
well as those which have been accepted by various courts. He then proposes a definition himself,
which, understandably, would be quite restrictive. He would confine the term to those occurances
caused by the build-up "of a confined, internal force or pressure which must occur accidently
and suddenly" followed by the violent and sudden failure of the confining material with the
resultant violent expansion of the confined material. Since he would require the explosion to be
accidental, however, his definition fails to include the common explosions planned and intentionally
executed in blasting operations, where only the resulting damage is unforseen or accidental.
While such a definition would undoubtedly be a benefit to insurance companies, it appears to be
too limited to be accepted by the courts.
' Whitley, Blasting-Basis of Liability: Negligence, Trespass or Absolute Liability, 40 N.C.L.
REV. 640 (1962).
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boom, the plaintiff can easily establish two elements necessary for invo-
cation of the doctrine: (1) that the damage was caused by an agency or
instrument within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (2) that it
was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
plaintiff.' It may be more difficult to convince the court that the third
necessary element is present, i.e., that damaging overpressures would not
ordinarily have occurred in the absence of someone's negligence. However,
since every pilot should know that the overpressures from sonic booms
may very well cause ground damage, and that improper flight procedures
and circumstances produce excessive overpressures, it is submitted that
the failure on the part of a pilot to remain subsonic during movements
and maneuvers and when flying at low altitudes is ordinarily negligence.
It is worthy of note that federal regulations preclude government pilots
from breaking the sound barrier except in specified situations. 1 More-
over, the modern trend of authority clearly sanctions the application of
Itres ipsa" to aircraft accidents in general. ' In addition, it is now estab-
lished that alternative pleadings can be made in order to introduce evidence
of specific acts of negligence without precluding the applicability of "res
ipsa"."
However, it should be noted that "res ipsa" may be of only minimal
aid to the irate property owner. Except in a small minority of states, where
it establishes a full-fledged presumption," the principle is regarded as
establishing a mere inference of negligence" which will not support a
directed verdict.' The doctrine's sole utility seems to be in getting the
case to the jury; however, this may be of considerable value in view of
the fact that the doctrine has been successfully invoked in several ground
damage cases.""
B. Strict Liability
According to the Restatement of Torts, ' "an activity is ultra-hazardous
4"PROSSER, TORTS, 218 (3d ed. 1964).
41 General Flight Rules, AFR 60-16 (1962) (revised 1965).
42 Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959); Swanson v. United States,
229 F. Supp. 217, 222 (N.D. Cal. 1964); Becker v. American Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 839
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); Schneider v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Norden v.
United States, 187 F. Supp. 594 (D.R.I. 1960); and Rogow v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 547
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). Comments on Recent Important Aviation Cases, 31 JATLA 548, 553 (1965).
4' This practice has been allowed in the following aviation cases: Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., Schneider v. United States, Becker v. American Airlines, Inc., and Swanson v. United States
cited note 42 supra. See Comments on Recent Important Aviation Cases, supra note 42, at 554 for
cases approving of this practice in non-aviation cases.
"See, e.g., Roberts v. Trans-World Airlines, 225 Cal. 2d 344, 37 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Cal. D.C.A.
1964); See cases cited in PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 40, at 234.
"Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951); Bitner v. Hines, 293 S.W.2d
540 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
'Rehm v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 157 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Calhoun v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
"'United States v. Johnson, 228 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1961); Schneider v. United States, 188 F.
Supp 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Norden v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 594 (D.R.I. 1960).
48RESTATEMENT, TORTS S 520, comment (c) (1938). Comment (b) declares that "an activity
may be ultrahazardous because of . . . the condition which it creates." Comment (a) goes on to
say that the rule "is applicable to an activity which is of such utility that the risk unavoidably
involved in carrying it on cannot be regarded as so unreasonable as to make it negligent to carry
it on .... "
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if it (a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or
chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost
care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage." Even if flight regula-
tions are such as will keep overpressures within a non-damaging range,
the Oklahoma City tests indicate that boom scatter or variation (due to
wind velocity, temperature, terrain features, humidity, boundary layer
turbulence, and other meteorological parameters)" causes one boom in a
thousand-at every point in the boom carpet, which will be fifty to
eighty miles wide-to be twice as strong as the mean strength on the
flight track for a series of flights." More specifically, if flights are planned
so that boom-caused overpressures will be only 1.5 lbs. per sq. ft. during
the flight and 2 lbs. per sq. ft. on takeoff,"' the overpressures from one
flight in a thousand will be 3 to 4 lbs. per sq. ft., which, as noted previously,
will cause considerable damage to glass and plaster, as well as minor struc-
tural damage to frames and walls. Therefore, the operation of supersonic
transport aircraft will involve a risk of serious harm to property which
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and since flying
supersonic is not a matter of common usage, 2 such operations should be
classified as ultrahazardous activities. In view of the general principle that
operators of ultrahazardous activities are held strictly liable," the com-
mercial airlines should stand as insurers for all damage proximately caused
by sonic booms."'
Previously, both the courts and the law" looked upon aviation from the
viewpoint expressed by the American Law Institute in 1938 that aviation
is an ultrahazardous activity." The Uniform Aeronautic Act, adopted in
twenty-three states, imposed absolute liability on the owners, operators,
and lessees of aircraft for any damage caused by their operation, so long
as there was no contributory negligence on the part of the person harmed."'
However, this view has been rejected since aircraft operation has become
safer, and the trend of decisions has established the general rule that an
airplane is not an inherently dangerous instrument when properly handled
by a competent pilot exercising reasonable care, and that the ordinary
rules of negligence apply." However, in the case of sonic booms this point
" Power, supra note 13, at 618.
" Lundberg, supra note 11, at 55.
'
51d. at 27, 55.
"'RESTATEMENT, TORTS S 520, comment (e) (1938), states that "an activity is a matter of
common usage if it is customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind or by many people
in the community." It goes on to say that the operation of automobiles is a matter of common
usage, while blasting (including the manufacture, storage, transportation, and use of high explosives)
and the drilling of oil wells are not such matters.
5" In order to recover from the government, negligence will still have to be shown, as the rules
of strict liability do not apply in actions brought against the government under 28 U.S.C. 55
1346(b) or 2674 (1964). Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Stratton v. United States,
213 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
"Whitley, supra note 39, at 647.
"
5 Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1949).
"RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § $20, Comment (b) (1938).57 Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1949).
81bid.; 8 AM. JuR. 2d Aviation S 64 (1963). United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322 (5th
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 828 (1960); King v. United States, 178 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.
1949); Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp., 103 Cal. App. 2d 1022, 229 P.2d 114 (1951).
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has not yet been reached, but if technology and procedures should advance
to the point where all damage can be eliminated by the exercise of due
care, only then should the courts refuse to find strict liability for boom
damage.
The analogy between "explosions" and sonic booms may be of use to
the landowner in establishing strict liability, as well as in recovering under
an insurance policy. Almost all American jurisdictions have held the de-
fendant absolutely liable for injury caused by rocks and debris thrown
by blasting.' This is true whether the injury is to persons" or to property."'
The majority of states also finds absolute liability for concussion damages
resulting from blasting." However, a minority of states does make a dis-
tinction and require proof of negligence in concussion cases," unless a
nuisance is shown." Sonic booms are very similar to concussion shock
waves in that both, being shock waves, involve abnormal pressure forces
eminating from outside the premises affected.
The courts have relied primarily on two grounds to impose strict liability
in blasting cases. Trespass is commonly agreed to have been committed
when debris or rocks are thrown onto plaintiff's property." The majority
of states have refused to distinguish cases in which the damage is caused
by the concussion or vibration effects of blasting. Such courts find trespass
in both situations." While this theory is still sound, the trend has been to
hold the defendant strictly liable because he is engaged in an ultra-
"Burden of Proving Negligence in Non-Trespass Blasting Cases Lightened, 30 FORDHAM L. REV.
544, 545 (1962). The only case to the contrary is a Washington case, Klepsch v. Donald, 30 Pac.
991 (1892), in which a rock was thrown horizontally 940-1200 feet, killing plaintiff's husband.
"Welz v. Manzillo, 113 Conn. 674, 155 At. 841 (1931); Wells v. Knight, 32 RI. 432, 80
At. 16 (1911); Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N.Y. 290, 55 N.E. 923 (1900).
" Asheville Constr. Co. v. Southern Ry., 19 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1927); Adams & Sullivan v.
Sengel, 177 Ky. 535, 197 S.W. 974 (1917); Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849). Contra,
Bennett v. Texas-Ill. Gas Pipeline Co., 113 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Ark. 1953) (requiring proof of
negligence).
eBurden of Proving Negligence in Non-Trespass Blasting Cases Lightened, supra note 59, at 545.
eProof of negligence is required because of the early common law distinction between trespass
and case which considered the injury to be consequential, i.e., less than a physical invasion of
plaintiff's premises. PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS, at 161 n. 175 (1953),
cites cases from Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Maine, New Jersey, and Texas as so
holding. It should be noted that New York, formerly the leading advocate of the minority position,
has recently lightened the burden of proving negligence in blasting cases by holding in Schlansky
v. Augustus V. Reigal, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 493, 174 N.E.2d 730, 215 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1961), that a
prima facie case of negligence is established "by a showing of injury to plaintiff's property, and the
testimony of an expert, who had visited the scene, that excessive explosives had been used." By
analogy, the argument, in the case of damage by a sonic boom, could be that prima facie negligence
is established where it is shown that the aircraft was going too fast considering the altitude at
which it was flying or the maneuvers in which it engaged. This could be determined by the amount
of overpressure produced. The result of the New York decision is that the burden of going forward
is shifted to the defendant. Chief Justice Desmond's comments seem to indicate that if the question
of strict liability had been presented in Schlansky, the court would have dropped the requirement
that negligence be proved in concussion cases and conformed to the almost universally approved
doctrine that a blaster is absolutely liable for any damage he causes, with or without trespass.
"Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944).
"Asheville Constr. Co. v. Southern Ry., 19 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1927); Hakkila v. Old Colony
Broken Stone & Concrete Co., 162 N.E. 895 (S.J.C. Mass. 1928); Burden of Proving Negligence in
Non-Trespass Blasting Cases Lightened, supra note 59, at 545; Whitley, supra note 39, at 641.
'Ibid.; Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931); Britton v. Harrison
Const. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W.Va. 1948); Johnson v. Kansas City Terminal R.R., 182 Mo.
App. 349, 170 S.W. 456 (1914).
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hazardous activity." Regardless of the theory applied, though, in most
jurisdictions the defendant is held strictly liable for all damages caused by
his blasting operations."8
It is therefore submitted that strict liability should be found applicable
against the airlines in the case of damaging sonic booms for two reasons.
First, the operation of supersonic aircraft will cause some damage which
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and it therefore
should be treated as an ultrahazardous activity. Secondly, sonic booms
involve the same phenomena and effects as do concussions from blasting;
therefore, the blasting laws should apply.
VI. SUGGESTED LEGISLATION
It is generally recognized that supersonic transport aircraft will have to
fly at higher altitudes than those at which present commercial aircraft
fly in order to minimize the overpressures which they will create. Com-
mercial flights at sustained altitudes of 60,000 feet or more will also con-
tribute to efficiency of operation once the altitude is attained. In fact,
mandatory flight procedures, in the manner of corridors and permissible
Mach numbers as functions of altitude and climb angle, and the require-
ment of subsonic take-offs and descents will probably have to be estab-
lished. Such regulations should serve to minimize all harmful effects of
the supersonic fleet's operations.
If such procedures are established, when damaging overpressures are
created, the plaintiff could possibly establish negligence per se by showing
that the airline violated the applicable regulations."9 If negligence were
the basis used in seeking recovery, however, the fact that an aircraft had
been operated in accordance with the statutory requirements would not
preclude a finding of negligence.'" "The statutory standard is no more
than a minimum, and does not necessarily preclude a finding that the
actor was negligent in failing to take additional precautions."'"
VII. CONCLUSION
Most of the legal questions raised in this area have not yet been an-
swered, but the American legal system is rich in principles which are
67See, e.g., Exner v. Sherman Constr. Co., supra note 66; Fairfax Inn, Inc. v. Sunnyhill Mining
Co., 97 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. W.Va. 1951).
6s Burden of Proving Negligence in Non-Trespass Blasting Cases Lightened, supra note S9, at
545; Whitley, supra note 39, at 641.
s9 Once the statute is determined to be applicable-which is to say, once it is inter-
preted as designed to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included,
against the risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred as a result of its
violation-the great majority of the courts hold that an unexcused violation is con-
clusive on the issue of negligence, and that the court must so direct the jury ....
This usually is expressed by saying that the unexcused violation is negligence "per se"
or in itself. PROSSER, Op. cit. supra note 40, at 202.
See also the RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (3d ed. 1964).
"
5 Grand Truck Ry. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408 (1892); McGettigan v. New York Cent. Ry., 268
N.Y. 66, 196 N.E. 745 (1935); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Perkins, 125 II1. 127, 17 N.E. I (1888).
71 PROSSERt, Op. cit. supra note 40, at 205.
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adaptable to the new problems which will be encountered. Legislative
regulations can minimize the damage by rigid control of flight plans and
operations, but some damage is inevitable. This unavoidable damage may
be covered by the "all-risk," "aircraft damage," or explosion coverages
of present insurance policies, or the Federal Tort Claims Act in cases in-
volving military aircraft. Under federal regulation, deviation from the
prescribed rules will go far toward establishing negligence if proof of
negligence becomes necessary. "Res ipsa loquitur" will also be useful if
strict liability is rejected. However, it appears that the wholly innocent
landowner should be allowed to recover from the airlines, which should
be held strictly liable on public policy grounds. Since supersonic trans-
ports will cause certain inevitable damage, the airlines should be required to
pay their own way. Since the traveling public is demanding supersonic
aircraft, it should bear the ultimate cost for the actual physical damage
to property, which inevitably follows, through the increased fares which
the airlines will be forced to charge on supersonic flights.
H. Lloyd Kelley III
Intrastate Carrier - Competitive Impact -
Pacific Southwest Airlines
I. INTRODUCTION
The air transport industry in the United States is heavily regulated by
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The Board's duties include main-
taining strict control over the number of participating carriers in the
various city-pair markets of the United States, and over the fares which
they charge. Nevertheless, the CAB's power is not unlimited; it has no
authority to control operations of carriers which do not operate in inter-
state commerce. Until recently, this restriction has been almost an aca-
demic one, simply because no large intrastate carriers existed. But within
the last five years, one such airline, Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA), has
grown to become the leading carrier over one of the principle air routes
in the United States. Flying solely within the state of California, PSA
escapes federal control, and it has used this freedom to advantage in com-
peting with several federally-controlled carriers in the Los Angeles-San
Francisco market. The intrastate carrier now flys forty percent of the
traffic over this busy route and has impressive profit records as well.
This article will examine the growth of PSA in the Los Angeles-San
Francisco market and the effect this growth has had on fares and traffic
over the route. In addition, a brief comparison will be made of the New
York-Washington market. Two significant facts emerge from this study:
first, that a small carrier concentrating in a single market can compete
successfully in this market with much larger carriers having national route
systems; and second, that this competition can result in greatly improved
service to the traveling public in the form of lower fares, improved equip-
ment, and more convenient scheduling. It would be well to bear in mind
these results when attempting to formulate proposals to improve the na-
tion's air transport system.
II. THE FERTILE MARKET
The Los Angeles-San Francisco market is presently flying more pas-
sengers than any other city-pair in the world, and it is currently the
only major domestic intrastate route.' The growth rate in this market has
been a source of wonder to industry observers. Origin-destination pas-
sengers increased two hundred and fifty percent between 1957 and 1964,
whereas nationwide trunk traffic rose only seventy percent over the same
period. A recent CAB report predicted that 1965 Los Angeles-San Francisco
I As of 1962, Buffalo-New York City was the second largest intrastate market, with 273,000
annual passengers. CAB, 1963 HANDBOOK OF AIRLINE STATISTICS 494 (1964).
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traffic would approach 2.7 million, but recent figures indicate that 3.1
million actually made the trip, a jump of forty percent in one year."
A. The Intruder
The growth of this market is largely the result of the vigorous compe-
tition that has existed on this route, attributable primarily to the impetus
of Pacific Southwest Airlines. Starting with a single rented DC-3 sixteen
years ago, PSA now initiates a flight from one of the two cities at an aver-
age interval of fifteen minutes. Included in its fleet are five new jets. The
carrier is still small by industry trunk standards; its current revenues are
less than half those of Northeast, one-twentieth of United's.
PSA has succeeded in this market by continually undercutting the fares
of its trunk competitors, while keeping equipment competitive. In early
1958 PSA was charging $10.99 for coach service on the 347 mile route,
whereas the trunks were charging $26.35 for first-class and $16.56 for
coach. However, PSA passengers were accommodated in outmoded DC-4s,
while the trunks were using DC-6s, making their flights some ten minutes
shorter. This flight equipment inferiority left PSA with only fifteen per-
cent of the total market, or one-third of the coach market. With the
introduction of turboprop Electras in 1960, PSA obtained an equipment
advantage over United and Western, its two main trunk competitors.
(TWA also flys the route but does not offer turn-around service and makes
only a few flights a week.) United introduced jets the next year, but the
nature of the flight gave the new planes no time advantage over the
Electras. The route is too short for jets to take advantage of their higher
cruising speed; moreover, the CAB requires the trunks to fly over the
ocean on the route, adding twenty miles in flight length, while PSA flys
overland. Jets are, however, more comfortable than piston or turboprop
aircraft and have higher passenger appeal. By the end of 1960 PSA was
charging $12.99, compared with trunk fares of $18.10 to $30.31, depend-
ing on service and type of aircraft. PSA's passenger level increased by
almost one hundred percent in 1960, whereas the trunks' net figure showed
an actual decline.
The fortunes of the trunks reached a low in 1962. A nationwide fare
increase in February of that year put United's first-class jet fare at $31.30
and jet coach at $26.07. Western and United were both providing nonjet
first-class at $28.99 and nonjet coach at $18.65. PSA, offering 153 flights
a week, was charging the single fare of $14.18. PSA became the top carrier
in the market for the first time in the first quarter of 1962, carrying
159,000 passengers to second-place United's 138,000. In the second quarter,
PSA planes bore 177,000 passengers, more than United and Western com-
bined.
a Figures here and for much of this article were taken from two sources: 4 CAB STAFF RE-
SEARCH REP., TRAFFIC, FARES, AND COMPETITION: Los ANGELES-SAN FRANCISCO AIR TRAVEL
CORRIDOR (1965); and Morgan, West Coast Dogfight, The Wall Street Journal, 11 Feb. 1966,
p. 24, col. 1.
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B. Trunklines Meet The Advance
At that point the trunks began to retaliate. In June of 1962, Western
introduced its "Thriftair" service, using DC-6Bs at a fare of $13.58,
sixty cents below PSA's Electra service. In February of 1963, Western's
fare was reduced even further-to $12.00. However, Western's flight time
was thirty-five minutes longer than the other carriers. Nevertheless, the
attraction of a lower fare increased Western's market share, and in mid-
1963 it passed United as PSA's chief competitor. Passenger figures for the
third quarter of 1963 were 238,000 for PSA, 183,000 for Western, and
79,000 for United.
In October, 1964, United introduced low-cost "Jet Commuter" service,
charging $15.23 for a fifty-five minute flight on Boeing 727s. The new
service was an immediate success (reflecting the appeal of jets) and only
$1.05 more than PSA's Electra flights and $3.23 more than Western's
ninety minute DC-6B flights. United originally started with 138 jet flights
a week, but by December it had increased to 196 weekly. Between the third
and fourth quarters of 1964, United's passengers increased from 61,000
to 180,000, while PSA's fell from 312,000 to 218,000 and Western's
from 214,000 to 175,000.TWA added a jet commuter service in February
of 1965, but it still had few flights. By March, 1965, United had regained
first place in the market, flying thirty-eight percent of the total passengers.
PSA was a close second with thirty-three percent; Western had nineteen
percent and TWA had moved up to eleven percent.
PSA soon regained the lead by adding its own new 727 jet in a "com-
muter" service. The fare for this flight was the same as that for Electra
service, $14.18, and flight time was down to forty-five minutes. United
and TWA cut their jet fares by $1.05 to meet the PSA price. Western
discontinued its "Thriftair" service and added a jet service at the same
fare as PSA, United, and TWA. PSA responded by cutting the fare of its
Electra service to $12.00, the lowest fare available for the trip. In June,
1965, PSA flew a record 402 flights between the two cities in one week.
By the close of the year, it had clearly recaptured the lead in the market,
flying forty percent of the traffic. United was second with thirty-six per-
cent, Western had twenty percent, and TWA had fallen to four percent.
Thus PSA, through vigorous competition in fares, equipment, and
scheduling, has been able to succeed in this important market. The trunks
have recently met the competition, and the advantages to the consumer
are evident. Averaged weighted fares for the route have declined from
$20.25 in 1961 to $16.14 in 1964, a drop of over four dollars. The figure
for 1965 will show a further drop, reflecting PSA's new $12.00 fare for
Electra service. This $12.00 fare represents the nation's lowest per-mile
rate, and even its $14.18 jet fare is well below the national average.
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TABLE 1
PASSENGER TRAFFIC AND FARES IN THE Los ANGELES-SAN FRANCISCO
AIR TRAVEL MARKET, 1955-1965
Passengers (in hundred's)
Year Trunks PSA Total Average Fares
1955 723 NA NA NA
1956 725 NA NA NA
1957 817 124 941 $18.21
1958 851 157 1,007 19.19
1959 948 206 1,155 19.70
1960 874 385 1,259 19.09
1961 856 473 1,329 20.25
1962 773 732 1,504 19.64
1963 912 925 1,837 17.49
1964. 1,154 1,072 2,226 16.14
1965 1,850 1,250 3,100 NA
SouRcas: Passengers 1955-1964 from 4 CAB STAFF RESEARCH REP., TRAFIc, FARES, AND COM-
PETITION: Los ANGELES-SAN FRANCISCO AIR TRAVEL CORRIDOR, p. 25 (1965); 1965
passenger figures from Morgan, West Coast Dogfight, The Wall Street Journal, 11 Feb.
1966, p. 24, col. 1.
III. PSA's IMPACT-ADJUSTMENT IN THE EAST
Recently, the Los Angeles-San Francisco fares have been cited by critics
of Eastern's New York-Washington "shuttle." This major city-pair ranked
second in passenger volume in the nation in 1962. Since 1960, Eastern's
position in the market has grown markedly. In that year American and
Eastern each had roughly a third of the traffic, with Northeast holding
about a fifth. In the spring of 1961, Eastern inaugurated its shuttle service,
featuring a no-reservation, guaranteed-seat policy. According to this policy,
if there is a shortage of seats to accommodate all the passengers on a single
flight, a second plane must be rolled out to carry the extra customer or
customers. Eastern started with the shuttle fare at $12.73 without tax,
but eight months later it was raised to $13.64. At this juncture, Eastern
had thirty-five percent of the market. In January, 1963, with Eastern
controlling fifty percent of the traffic, the fare was increased to $14.29.
In January, 1964, with Eastern holding seventy-seven percent of the
traffic, the CAB granted another raise to $15.24. Eastern claims not to
have made a profit on the operation until 1964. Although Eastern was
already in the black, the Board granted another fare increase in January,
1965, making the fare $18.00." Eastern, until recently, had been using rela-
tively inferior equipment (Constellations and DC-7Bs). More recently,
Electras were introduced on the shuttle, with the older planes as back-up
equipment. In April, Eastern introduced purejets to the route.
Until a few months ago Eastern's $18.00 fare was, for all practical
purposes, the lowest available fare on the New York-Washington route.
American offered a $16.12 coach service, but on only a few flights per
day. The bulk of American's service was first-class, costing $18.85. Con-
a The last of these fare increases passed by only a 3 to 2 vote. Primary source for this discussion
is Ridgeway, Eastern's Shuttle Service, The New Republic, 15 Jan. 1966, pp. 8-9.
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sidering that one received a reasonably good meal for $.85, this was, per-
haps, the more desirable flight. But, again, flights were infrequent.
In the summer of 1965, Senator Edward Kennedy attacked the Board
for allowing Eastern to gain a solid monopoly in this market and then
granting four fare increases in five years. He cited the Los Angeles-San
Francisco route as evidence that service was poor in the East. A com-
parison of fares in PSA markets with those in markets of comparable




City-pair Fare Mileage (cents Per mile)
Boston-New York $15.24 184 8.28
Boston-Washington 25.71 399 6.44
New York-Washington 17.14 215 7.97
West Coast Fares
Los Angeles-San Francisco 11.43 347 3.29
Los Angeles-San Diego 6.35 109 5.83
San Francisco-San Diego 19.85 449 4.42
Sotmc: Aviation Week, 18 Jan. 1965, p. 37. (Fares are before tax.)
Eastern has argued that poorer weather conditions in the East, higher air-
port landing fees ($36.00 in the East compared to $18.00 in the West),
and the high cost of back-up service have prevented any excess profits on
the route. If it were not obligated to guarantee a seat, Eastern has claimed
it would need only fourteen shuttle planes rather than the present thirty-
nine. While actual levels of profitability are kept secret (and the CAB has
yet to investigate them, despite its willingness to allow fare increases),
one representative of Eastern reported that the carrier hoped to reach a ten
percent return on its investment in the route in 1965.4
While Eastern's first two arguments about higher costs (weather and
airport fees) are valid, the third is not. Customers are interested in con-
venient service and reasonable fares, not in the prospect of possibly having
the opportunity to ride alone in a back-up airplane. High frequency of
flights, along with an efficient reservation system, have ensured passengers
on the Los Angeles-San Francisco route a seat. Eastern's system of twenty-
five stand-by crews and planes to back-up the fourteen regular shuttle
planes is unquestionably an inefficient system. A vigorous competitor,
concentrating in this market, could undoubtedly find a less expensive way
to transport people between New York and Washington.
There are, however, signs of improvement in the East. United has sought
permission to offer a $14.00 jet coach service in the New York-Washington
city-pair. Moreover, this past April, Eastern introduced certain off-peak
fare cuts amounting to roughly three dollars a ticket. But in light of air-
line history, one feels justified in not having great expectations about the
likelihood of vigorous trunkline fare competition.
Compared with those of the East, West Coast profits have been high.
SN.Y. Times, 23 Jan. 1966, S 5, p. 18, col. 5.
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PSA's return on investment was 21.49 percent in 1963 and 24.90 percent
in 1964. Profits fell somewhat from $2.9 million in 1964 to $2.0 million in
1965, due primarily to the purchase of five new jets. Traffic for the first
month of 1966 was up thirty-five percent over January, 1965, however,
and the company forecasts record earnings this year. By retaining earnings,
the stockholder equity has risen from $917,081 at the beginning of 1959 to
$11.5 million in 1966. It must be remembered that these figures are for
PSA's total system, not just for the Los Angeles-San Francisco market.
This market does constitute, however, seventy percent of the carrier's
annual passenger total. It would be very difficult to determine the extent
to which this market is more or less profitable than the carrier's other
intra-California operations; yields (fare per mile) on the other segments
are higher but traffic is lighter. PSA is free to drop any route it chooses,
and so it presumably does not fly any unprofitable ones. Information on
the profitability of the trunks is, of course, not available.
PSA's profits on the Los Angeles-San Francisco market have resulted
from a combination of low fares and high load factors. The Board esti-
mated PSA's load factors for the years 1961 to 1964 at seventy-one,
seventy-seven, seventy-seven, and seventy-nine percent respectively.
United, likewise, reported load factors on its "jet commuter" flights to
be close to eighty percent. Thus, it appears that the combination of high
load factors and low fares can be just as profitable as low load factors and
high fares, the only difference being that the first provides much better
service to the public. Another important lesson provided by experience in
this market is that a small, limited-market carrier can be highly efficient
and compete effectively with trunks. PSA's small size has clearly been
no hindrance to its effective utilization of the most expensive equipment
in the industry.
IV. CAN PSA's SUCCESS BE DUPLICATED ELSEWHERE?
There are arguments which suggest that competition's success story in
California may be an exceptioh and that one should not expect similar
results in other markets. One such argument is that PSA has an unusual
cost advantage over the trunks in that it is allowed to make a direct
flight between the two cities rather than the circuitous over-the-water
route. One would not expect a limited-market carrier to have a similar
cost advantage elsewhere. This factor is relatively unimportant, however,
for it makes at best a $.3 5 differential per seat per flight. It is also pointed
out that PSA uses slightly irregular ticketing practices which the CAB
would not permit of a certificated carrier. For instance, PSA pays an
eight percent commission to travel agents, rather than the industry-wide
five percent. In this instance, regulation of the trunks gives the intrastate
carrier a competitive advantage because it does not have to meet industry
standards.
'Computed from FAA, DIRECT OPERATING COSTS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE CHARACTERIS-
TICS OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN AIRLINE SERVICE, 1963 (1964).
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Another argument, which upon first exposure seems plausible, is that
the sharp competition on this route was possible only because of the ex-
tremely fast growth of the market; had the market grown at a more
normal rate, the frequent scheduling of the carriers and the low yields
over the route would have resulted in financial ruin. The flaw in this
argument, however, is that it appears that the fast growth in the market
was, to a large degree, caused by the competition. Low prices and con-
venience of scheduling have persuaded many people to fly the route who
otherwise would have taken other means of transportation or would not
have made the trip. Train and bus service between the two cities has de-
clined markedly in recent years.' The CAB Staff Research Report deter-
mined, by extrapolating traffic figures from the period of stable prices (pre-
1962) over the period of falling average fares (post-1962), that 1964
traffic was 35.5 percent higher than it would have been had fares not de-
clined 25.4 percent since 1962. This gave the market a fare elasticity of 1.3,
despite a high percentage of business travel over the market (seventy per-
cent compared to the national average of roughly sixty percent).' Business
passengers, being on expense accounts, are generally considered a less price
elastic group than other passengers. Moreover, the CAB considered this
1.3 figure to be low, for it felt that the market had not yet had a chance
to respond to the lower fares, and that longer-term figures would show
the market's elasticity to be somewhat higher. The unexpected surge of
traffic in 1965 shows this to be true.
Industry observers have long felt that air transport is a price elastic
industry and that the airlines have failed to capitalize on this factor. As
a result, both the carriers and the potential passenger have suffered. The
introduction of coach service in the late 1940's sharply increased the
traffic in the nation. Two CAB surveys of coach passengers in 1949 showed
that only thirty-six percent would have used regular first-class air service
had the coach service not been available. The other sixty-four percent
would either not have made the trip or would have used other modes of
transportation.' Richmond feels that lower fares and economy-class service
on long-haul routes would have "a strong effect on traffic generation.""
Cherington concludes that although demand seems inelastic for fare de-
creases of less than ten percent, larger decreases, as experienced with coach
service has shown, generally result in higher total revenues. I° Barber, point-
ing out that eighty percent of the American people have never traveled by
airplane, charges that airlines have concentrated their efforts on luxury
s In early 1966 Southern Pacific dropped its night-train service between the two cities, for which
coach fare had been $12.50. Traffic in 1965 for this service was 68,000 passengers, down from
a figure of 250,000 ten years before. Bus lines, which charge $9.65 for the trip, claim that lower
air fares have eliminated the 10% annual growth which they had been experiencing until two
years ago. Morgan, supra note 2, at 24.
74 CAB STAFF RESEARCH REP., Op. cit. suPra note 2, at 21. William Gregory criticizes the
conclusions of the report, saying that they did not consider the improved economic situation of the
two cities during the period of passenger growth. Gregory, Refined Fare Elasticity Measure Sought,
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 Jan. 1966, pp. 40-43.
SCHERINGTON, AIRLINE PRICE POLICY 38 (1958).
9 RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION 47 (1961).
10 CHERINGTON, Op. cit. supra note 8, at 437, 439.
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business travel, designing their services for only a "very small segment of
the potential market.""1 Hence, there is every indication that growth rates
similar to those of the Los Angeles-San Francisco market can be generated
elsewhere.
Another factor of the Los Angeles-San Francisco market that, it is
argued, cannot be easily duplicated is PSA's unusual imagination and
managerial talent. PSA has displayed, in the words of the Wall Street
Journal, a certain "show-biz flair." 1' Pilots have humorous intercom rou-
tines to replace the more conventional welcomes. Alert stewardesses re-
member regular passengers' names and throw surprise cake-and-cham-
pagne birthday parties in flight. Each year the company gives its five
most-traveled passengers free use of a plane and crew for one hour. But
imaginative thinking like this is that which one might expect from a local,
limited-market carrier, rather than from a transcontinental giant. As
stated by the CAB, smaller lines are more likely to display "greater effort
and exercise of managerial ingenuity."'
Although PSA's uncertificated position has been advantageous in some
instances, the carrier has had to overcome certain drawbacks which accom-
pany this position. Out-of-state visitors to California have most likely
never heard of PSA, while United is a familiar name. Moreover, PSA is
the only carrier flying the Los Angeles-San Francisco route that is not
receiving government mail revenues. In spite of these drawbacks, perhaps
the best indication that limited-market carriers can operate successfully in
sectors of the country other than California is practical experience. For a
short period, at least, Lone Star Airlines, another intrastate carrier, flew
high-frequency service between Dallas and Houston at a fare of $10.80,
compared to $14.50 offered by the certificated carriers."' Trans-Texas Air-
ways, a local-service carrier, recently offered to fly the Houston, Dallas,
Austin triangle for fares thirty-five percent below those offered by Braniff."
Two nonskeds, Viking Airlines and Standard Airlines, made profits on
low-fare,, dense-seating flights between New York-Chicago and New
York-Los Angeles, offering fares as much as $50.00 below those of the
trunks. The CAB halted these flights in 1950. Later, under a different name,
these carriers tried the same type of operation in the Miami-New York
market, managing to offer fairly regular service by "artful shuffling of
schedules." But the CAB, in the words of Bendiner, "killed" this operation
in 1955. When the CAB reopened the New York-Florida Renewal Case
last year, Panagra, a small international carrier owning only eight aircraft,
applied to service New York-Miami with high density seating for a fare
of $28.00.
" Barber, Airline Mergers, Monopoly, and the CAB, 28 J. AIR L. & CoM. 199 (1961-1962).
12 Morgan, supra note 2, at 24.
"
3 Rocky Mountain Case, 6 C.A.B. 736 (1946).
"CAvEs, Ant TRANSPORT AND ITs REGULATORS; AN INDUSTRY STUDY 88-89 (1962).
IS Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 Jan. 1964, p. 34. Although these are intrastate routes,
Trans-Texas is an interstate carrier, certified by the CAB as a local-service line. Thus even its intra-
state operations are regulated by the Board.
loBendiner, The Rise and Fall of the Nonskeds, Reporter, 30 May 1957, p. 34.
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V. CONCLUSION
The indications are, then, that limited-market air carriers can operate
effectively in other markets in the United States. Not all such carriers will
survive,"' but those that do will introduce healthy price competition into
the heavily traveled air routes. Load factors will rise on those routes which
presently have overcapacity, while excess profits on the major routes will
be eliminated. Lower fares will induce more people to fly, and this in turn
will lower costs, allowing fares to fall still lower. PSA's high profits indi-
cate that price competition on the West Coast has not yet subsided. The
Los Angeles-San Francisco market serves as an example to the CAB and to
the public that vigorous competition on major routes can substantially im-
prove service and that limited-market carriers are well qualified to guar-
antee that such competition takes place.
James R. Atwood*
"Two other intrastate carriers have attempted to enter the Los Angeles-San Francisco market
in the last ten years but have failed. There is no reason to expect, however, that failures among the
new limited-market carriers would be any more frequent than failures among the certificated
carriers in past years.
* This is a portion of a paper which shared first prize honors in the Frank M. Patterson com-
petition for the best paper at Yale in political science. The author graduated magna cum laude from
Yale University in 1966 and is presently attending Stanford University School of Law.
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RECENT DECISIONS
MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT-SUBSIDIZED CARRIER-
CAB DISAPPROVAL
American Airlines and Mohawk Airlines requested CAB approval of a
mutual aid agreement.' The pact provided that if either party suffered
a cessation of operation due to specified strikes, the other would pay to
the struck party an amount equal to its increased revenues attributable
to the strike less applicable added direct expenses. Held: The agreement is
adverse to the public interest. "Mohawk is a subsidized regional carrier, and
there is a substantial risk that the costs of the protection offered Mohawk
under the agreement will be borne by public funds in the form of in-
creased subsidy payments to Mohawk." Mutual Aid Agreement Between
Am. Airlines, Inc., and Mohawk Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 13781,
CAB Order No. E-24213 (23 Sept. 1966).
The Board distinguished the instant agreement from the prior approved
Trunkline Mutual Aid Pact where the parties were all unsubsidized carriers.
Mohawk argued: (1) that if American was struck, the payments it would
make would not come from subsidy payments to Mohawk, but rather from
increased revenue, and (2) that if Mohawk was struck it would receive
payments from American that would decrease the subsidy payments. The
CAB rejected these arguments because of Mohawk's participation in a
profit-sharing plan under the class rate. This plan provided that if the
subsidized carrier's annual earnings exceed a fixed percent after taxes, a
percentage of the profits are refunded to the government.! Because of
this the Board stated: "It can be anticipated that the carrier's earnings
[Mohawk] would reach the 75 percent profit-sharing bracket in the
event of a strike on American, its major trunkline competitor. Thus in
the event of an American strike, payments to the latter would indirectly
be underwritten by subsidy to the extent of 75 percent."' The dissenting
Board member felt that "as subsidy eligibility is dependent upon economic
status which may change from time to time the same possibility exists
as to the trunk carriers." Thus he saw no basis for distinguishing an
agreement between trunklines and one between a trunkline and a subsi-
dized local.
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 412, 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C. S 1382 (1966):
(a) Every air carrier shall file with the Board a true copy . . . of every contract or
agreement . . . affecting air transportation. .. .
(b) The Board shall by order disapprove any such contract or agreement, whether
or not previously approved by it, that it finds to be adverse to the public interest ...
Rate of Return Percentage of Profits
(After Taxes) Refunded by Carrier
0% to D* 0%
D to 13.5% 50%
Over 13.5% 75%
* D represents the fair and reasonable differentiated rate of return, not to exceed a maximum
of 11%, and not less than a minimum of 9%. Mutual Aid Agreement Between Am. Airlines, Inc.,
and Mohawk Airlines, Inc., CAB Docket No. 13781, CAB Order No. E-24213 (23 Sept. 1966),
p. 4, n. 5.
' Id. at 4.4 Id. at 5.
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The possibility that the original pact would have benefited Mohawk
and eventually the public, through decreased subsidy payments, coupled
with the power of the Board to disapprove prior approved agreements,
would seem to be reason enough for CAB approval in this case.
The Board, however, did not prejudice the submission of a revised
agreement which would assure against any possible subsidy burden through
Mohawk's participation. Such an agreement would probably require the
setting of a maximum percentage which Mohawk would have to pay to
American, based on Mohawk's total rate of return.
I.K.M.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT-INSIDER'S LIABILITY-
SHORT-SWING PROFITS
Petteys and Reavis, directors and stockholders of Northwest Airlines,
rather than submit to a redemption of their preferred stock at a value
considerably below market value,1 exercised their conversion rights and
received in exchange an equivalent amount of common stock. Both di-
rectors had held the preferred stock for more than six months. Within six
months after the conversion, however, each man sold a portion of his
newly-acquired common stock at a price substantially above the market
value of the common stock at the time of conversion.' The directors,
Petteys and Reavis, filed suit for declaratory judgment to determine
whether, under Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, they were liable to the corporation for the profits realized on these
sales. At the same time, a stockholder instituted a derivative suit on behalf
of the corporation against these directors to recover the profits. The two
suits were combined for judicial convenience. Each party moved for
summary judgment. Held, shareholder's motion granted: A sale of a cor-
porate security by an insider within six months after acquisition of the
security is a transaction which Section 16(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 seeks to prevent regardless of whether such acquisition
was by actual purchase or by conversion of one security for another.
Petteys & Reavis v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 526 (D. Minn.
1965).
The directors claimed that their acquisition of the common stock did
not constitute a "purchase" within the statutory definition since the ex-
change of convertible preferred stock for common stock was involuntary.'
' The preferred and common stock of Northwest Airlines both had market values of $35 per
share at the time of the conversion. The redemption price of the preferred, however, was $26 per
share.
2 The trial court found that at no time did the directors have "control" of the corporation.
'The directors relied on Ferraido v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), which held that
where insiders had no control over the corporation's decision to redeem convertible preferred stock
at a value below the market value and where such preferred stock was marketably equivalent to
the corporation's common stock, the insider's conversion of the preferred was involuntary and
thus did not constitute a "purchase" as the word is used in Section 1.6(b) of Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934.
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The court, reasoning that it was the opportunity for insider short-swing
profits which the act sought to remove, decided in light of the "recent
trend" to apply the strict rule of Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Scbultz, which
concluded that the voluntariness of the conversion was unimportant since
the opportunity to engage in short-swing profits existed for the insiders in
any event. The court further pointed out that prior authority requires
forfeiture of profits irrespective of good faith;' thus, regardless of the good
faith of these directors in assuming that their transaction did not come
within the act, they are liable to the corporation for profits realized.!
A.C.R.
FAA-LICENSING STANDARDS-AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE
Petitioner was a pilot with some fifteen to twenty thousand flying hours
and held the highest performance rating. After being hospitalized pur-
suant to a court order adjudicating him insane, the FAA revoked his
medical certificate because he had a "character or behavior disorder severe
enough to have repeatedly manifested itself by overt acts."1 After being
discharged from the hospital, the petitioner applied for a review of the
FAA action. The FAA's Medical Review Board affirmed the administrator.
Petitioner then requested a hearing before an examiner for the CAB who
determined that the petitioner did not have, and had never had, a char-
acter or behavior disorder within the meaning of the regulations. The FAA
then petitioned the CAB for a discretionary review, and therein reversed
the examiner's decision and affirmed the FAA's denial of the medical
certificate. The petitioner then applied to the court of appeals for review
in accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (a), alleging that the physical fitness
standard set out in the regulations was incapable of reasonable interpre-
tation and was, therefore, unconstitutionally vague. The CAB had refused
to consider the validity of the FAA regulations on the grounds that the
question of validity was not within its scope of review. Held, aDirmed:
The physical fitness standard set out in the regulations does meet the con-
stitutional test of requisite certitude. Doe v. CAB, 356 F.2d 699 (10th Cir.
1966).
The court first considered the question of whether it could entertain
'Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1964); Blaw v. Lehman, 286 F.2d 786
(2d Cir. 1961); Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222 F. Supp. 831 (D.N.J. 1963). It is interesting
to note that the court in the instant case refused to attempt to reconcile the Parks and Perraido
cases.
a 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947). The court held that a conversion of preferred into common
stock followed by a sale within six months was a "purchase and sale" within the language of §
16(b) because the statutory definition of "purchase" is "any contract to buy, purchase or otherwise
acquire."
'The court based this holding on Western Auto Supply Co. v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d
736 (8th Cir. 1965).
'The decision has recently been reversed. Petteys v. Butler, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 2233 (1966).
'The standards are set forth in 14 C.F.R. § 67.13, 67.1Y, 67.17 (d) (1) (i).
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the issue of validity since the Board had declined to take jurisdiction
over the question. The court stated that the statutes for appellate review
do not specifically treat this matter and it has not been judicially deter-
mined. The principle that the FAA Administrator, and not the courts,
is empowered to set the standards for the physical fitness for those who
are licensed to operate aircraft in commerce was recognized by the court.
The petitioner is entitled to due process, and this involves not only giving
the petitioner notice and fair hearing but also informing him with reason-
able certainty and explicitness of the standards by which his fitness is
to be judged. The court then found that the regulation meets the con-
stitutional test of requisite certitude, and further, that it is a question of
fact whether the personality disorder has been repeatedly manifested by
overt acts. In this case, the facts were sufficient to support the findings of
the CAB.
w.C. S.
NEGLIGENCE-PUERTO RICO LAW-MORAL DAMAGES
Action against the carrier for breach of contract, or alternatively in
tort, for failing to advise the plaintiffs that they needed visas to enter
Spain, the country of final destination. As a result of this failure, the
passengers were forced to return to an intermediate point, Paris, and
subsequently decided to abandon their trip. The plaintiffs included a
passenger who, unknown to the carrier, was suffering from cancer, and
who died a year later allegedly greatly distraught over the fact that he
had been deprived of his only opportunity for a trip to his homeland.
From a judgment for the plaintiffs, the airline appealed contending that the
inflammatory facts of the plaintiff's health and disappointment should
have been excluded because these circumstances were not reasonably fore-
seeable. Held, vacated: The new trial to be conducted not inconsistent
with the opinion that under Puerto Rico law, where there was evidence
that the defendant, as an inducement to plaintiffs to purchase passage, held
itself out as a tourist or travel agency, and had negligently failed to pro-
vide the information that plaintiffs had reasonably been led to expect,
damages for negligence would include not only physical injury, but
proximate, though unforeseeable, injury of any sort. Therefore, the un-
foreseen suffering of the plaintiffs occasioned by the carrier's failure to
advise the plaintiffs that they needed visas in order to enter Spain could
be compensated.' Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Cesar Luis Castano,
358 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1966).
Only reasonably foreseeable damages are recoverable for breach of
contract. Admittedly, the plaintiff's physical and mental condition were
unknown to the carrier at the time in question so that no recovery in
' The court, in reaching its decision, expressly noted that it was only considering Puerto Rico
law, and recognized that elsewhere the decision might be different
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contract was possible. However, as to the alternative plea in tort, the
Puerto Rico statute is not necessarily limited to common law torts. In
particular, the concept of moral damages which is widely recognized in
Puerto Rico' is not a compensable injury at common law. At common law,
recovery for either a negligent gratuitous undertaking or a negligent mis-
representation may be had for physical injury only, except where there
has been "professional" negligence. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that
the concept of moral damages is firmly entrenched in Puerto Rico law and
the likelihood that the Puerto Rico court would expand the "professional"
negligence exception to encompass proximate, though unforeseeable, injury
of any sort, the court was persuaded to hold that the unforeseen suffering
occasioned by the defendant's failure to perform the services that plaintiffs
had reasonably been led to expect could be compensated. It remained for
the new trial, however, to determine whether this damage was proximate




The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission was formed
by a joint resolution and compact' between Virginia, Maryland, and the
District of Columbia to regulate mass transit in the Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area. The petitioner sought to review" an order of the Com-
mission granting taxicab fare increases for transit to and from the Wash-
ington National Airport to a competitor. Four objections were raised, most
significant being whether the Commission has jurisdiction to set fares for
trips to and from the airport when exclusive jurisdiction over the airport
has been granted to the federal government.! Held, affirmed: The grant of
exclusive jurisdiction over the airport to the federal government does not
exclude all state jurisdiction relating to the federal area inasmuch as
regulation of interstate taxi rates to and from the airport does not con-
flict with the internal control of the facilities. Bartsch v. Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n, 357 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1966).
In reaching the result, the court properly relied upon a Supreme Court
decision from which it quoted:
'See, e.g., Rivera v. Rossi, 64 P.R.R. 683 (1945); Merced v. Government of the Capitol of
Puerto Rico, 85 P.R.R. 530 (1962); and Infante v. Leith, 85 P.R.R. 23 (1962).
'Washington Metropolitan Transit Regulation Compact Act, 74 Stat. 1031 (1960), 40 U.S.C.
S 651 (note) (1964).
'Washington Metropolitan Transit Regulation Compact Act, § 17a, 74 Stat. 1031 (1960),
40 U.S.C. § 651 (note) (1964).
'Code of Virginia, Title 7, Ch. 1, §§ 7-9 (1949). Title 7 has been repealed in its entirety by
Ch. 102 of the 1966 Acts of the General Assembly, effective I July 1966, and has been replaced
by Title 7.1.
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The fiction of a state within a state can have no validity to prevent the
state from exercising its power over the federal area within its boundaries,
so long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by the
Federal Government. The sovereign rights in this dual relationship are not
antagonistic. Accommodation and cooperation are their aim. It is friction,
not fiction, to which we must give heed.4
In Virginia's grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government,
certain rights have been expressly reserved.! Going beyond such express
reservations, this case illustrates the nature and extent to which the courts
will allow state encroachment into areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
E.S.K.
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDING-DENIAL-
ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Petitioner had appealed from a trial court's verdict in a survival action,
resulting from the crash of a private airplane. Plaintiff in that suit, whose
husband was killed in the crash, commenced an action for wrongful death
and filed a motion for summary judgment naming petitioner as defendant.
Plaintiff contended that the issues of proximate cause and liability had
been resolved by the judgment in the survival action. Plaintiff also sought
leave of court to use testimony, certain depositions, and exhibits which
had been used in the survival action. Petitioner filed a motion that the
wrongful death action be stayed, contending that the matters on appeal
in the survival action would substantially affect the law and facts applic-
able to the wrongful death proceeding. The district court denied the
motion and refused to enter an order granting a motion to stay. The
petitioner then sought a supervisory writ from the Montana Supreme
Court directing the district court to vacate its order and to enter an order
staying the proceeding. Held, writ issued: The district court abused its
discretion by not granting the motion since the wrongful death action
would have been influenced by the outcome of the appeal in the survival
action. Ryder v. District Ct. of Fifteenth Judicial Dist., 417 P.2d 89
(Mont. 1966).
It appears that the court's decision was based on the practicalities of
the situation. The parties, counsel, and issues were identical in both suits.
The court stated that the situation was not one which required one plain-
tiff to await the determination of another plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff's
counsel in the wrongful death action demonstrated the close relationship
of the suits by: (1) contending that the issue of liability was the same;
4 Howard v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, 344 U.S. 624 (1953).
' The express reservations in Virginia's grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government
pertain to the State's jurisdiction and power (1) to levy a tax on the sale of oil, gasoline, and
other motor fuels and lubricants sold at the airport for use in over-the-road vehicles, (2) to
serve criminal and civil process, and (3) to regulate the manufacture, sale, and use of alcoholic
beverages.
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(2) seeking to use the depositions, testimony, and exhibits from the sur-
vival action; and (3) admitting that several questions concerning the lia-
bility issues in the survival action would be presented to the court on
appeal. The court, therefore, felt that it would be needless to proceed on
the wrongful death action until the issues raised on appeal had been de-
termined. Thus, the supervisory writ was issued to control the abuse of
discretion by the district court.
P.O.w.
